Effectiveness of International Law Enforcement Cooperation in Combating Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
1. Introduction
Definition of maritime piracy
Historically, piracy was defined as any criminal act of depredation committed by the crew or the passengers of a private ship and directed against another ship, or against persons and property aboard such ship, done on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. This definition, described in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), effectively describes what we understand as piracy today. However, in current times, piracy is no longer solely confined to acts against other ships. The term is now used to describe a variety of acts including armed robbery at sea, kidnap for ransom of the crew of a ship or indeed the use of the ship as a means to commit an act of terror. The 1982 UN Convention made a clear distinction between piracy and armed robbery. The Convention would later be modified with the Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) strategy, which came into force in September 2006 and would directly influence the state of piracy in Southeast Asia today. The ReCAAP agreement recognized that piracy and armed robbery are two distinct crimes that require different and appropriate levels of law enforcement cooperation to combat effectively.
The distinction between today’s acts of piracy and the piracy of the past is that modern pirates generally do not seize the ships or cargo. Instead, they take the crew and passengers hostage, often resulting in violent and life-threatening situations. The motive of modern-day pirates is the taking of valuable goods that are easily disposable, or a ransom for the safe return of the crew and ship. This suggests that the act of piracy is usually not premeditated as the pirates are likely to attack a passing ship as opposed to following plans of a ship that is of known value. A large majority of piracy occurs in territorial waters and there are some forms of piracy that occur within the jurisdiction of a state. In these cases, the state’s government may request law enforcement assistance in dealing with the crime.
1.1 Definition of Maritime Piracy
Piracy can be defined as any acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of a particular state. In order for any illegal act to be constituted as piracy, it must meet four specific criteria. These criteria are that the act is illegal or acts of violence, detention, or depredation, it is committed for private ends or political purposes, it is committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, and it is outside the jurisdiction of a sovereign state. At present, there is no universal definition of piracy in customary international law. This is due to the fact that the definition laid out in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adopts the four specific criteria listed above, but it is not universally agreed that this definition applies to all forms of modern piracy. This has caused some debate and discussion at the diplomatic level, and in recent years, states and international organizations have made an effort to define what constitutes piracy so that there is a clear understanding of what laws apply to it. An example of this is at the regional level in Southeast Asia, where ASEAN member states adopted the “Informal Work Arrangement to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia,” which seeks to facilitate cooperation with the shipping industry and more effectively prosecute pirates by defining what acts constitute piracy. The problem was also addressed briefly at the United Nations Security Council in its resolution on the situation in Somalia, where it expressed its concern regarding the financial aspect of ransom payments to pirates and sought to establish a working group to determine whether the pay of ransoms to pirates could be prosecuted as support to an illegal activity or a criminal act. This ongoing effort to define piracy at the international and regional levels reflects the lack of clarity and consensus on what acts actually constitute piracy in the contemporary legal and political context.
1.2 Overview of the Gulf of Aden
The Gulf of Aden is located in the Arabian Sea between Yemen on the south coast of the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia in the Horn of Africa. The Yemeni and Somali territories it borders make it one of the most active and strategic shipping lanes in the world. The gulf is a major energy corridor, and in 2006, it became the world’s second most active maritime lane. Consequently, the gulf is an important source of global energy supply, and it is vital for many countries worldwide that these shipping lanes remain free from piracy. Unfortunately, the location and geography of the area are a very obvious choice for piracy, and as it is a non-state actor influence on the international system, there is often a lack of security in the area. This situation has heightened the significance of protecting the international water lane in the region. In 2008 alone, it was estimated that piracy attacks in this area cost the global economy between 4.6-8.1 billion dollars. This affected more than just the countries immediately involved in the piracy attack and the shipping industry; it has global ramifications and has influenced the rising trend in maritime piracy in other areas of the world.
1.3 Importance of International Law Enforcement Cooperation
The importance of international law enforcement cooperation can be seen in various parts of the world where there is a regional, or in the extreme cases, a worldwide threat to security. Such cooperation has been seen to be effective in combating various forms of transnational organized crime. Where countries alone may be unable to deal with the threat effectively, it has been found that through cooperative agreements, information sharing, and collective action, one state can continue its own development whilst battling security threats. By taking a leading role in international law enforcement operations, a state is essentially attempting to solve an identified security threat by using elements of power in a manner which directly influences the environment. Through adaptation of the philosophy that development in a secure environment can be achieved, maritime piracy and the form of state building that it is undermining can be focused upon by affected states. By choosing specific operations aimed at crippling piracy networks, states can attempt to sever the link between piracy and those elements of society it is feeding off. An example of this would be law enforcement operations targeting the “financiers” of piracy operations and the specific operations against the pirate militias in Somalia mentioned earlier. Operations of this nature are certainly aimed at the symptoms of the greater problem but are an indicator of progression towards its resolution.
2. Factors Influencing Effectiveness
Furthermore, cooperation between states has tended to be reactive and short-term with nowhere near enough support. In recent years, there have been unanimous calls for the establishment of a multilateral legal framework designed to improve states’ cooperation in combating piracy while also directly addressing and severing the links between piracy and international terrorism. The counter-piracy legal framework recently enacted is comprised of international agreements and UN Security Council resolutions while also providing domestic laws of the states involved. The major distinguishing feature of the legal framework is the innovative use of the IMO, UN, and the EU. Previously, in most cases with international cooperation, a willingness between states to not dispute territorial integrity has been the only prerequisite. However, this has meant that cooperation, although well-intended, often lacks direction and allocation of resources as seen through the many ad hoc coalitions formed to combat piracy in its various locales. Under the legal framework, there is established a clear hierarchy within a division of labor between interested international and regional organizations and states with specific roles and mandates designed to complement each other towards the common goals of deterring, suppressing, and bringing to justice individual pirates and their leaders. The IMO is responsible for providing a universal strategy to coordinate state and intergovernmental organization activities. It acts as an information hub and directs the development of capacity and capability within states primarily through training and awareness programs while also researching and assessing the needs of the areas most affected by piracy. UNODC is heavily involved in the criminalization aspect of piracy by promoting the signing, ratification, and implementation of relevant treaties and enforcing laws primarily through a non-coercive assistance approach working with the states needing it. UNODC activities are focused mainly within Somalia, with the body working closely with the TFG and regional Puntland and Somaliland authorities. The EU and NATO have conducted anti-piracy military operations in the Indian Ocean, some of which have been notably successful, and the understandings of the legal framework allow for better coordination between these simultaneous operations and possible future joint actions with other organizations or states. EU NavFor has previously stated it will hand over captured pirates to Kenya for trial through an agreement with the Kenyan authorities, and this is precisely the kind of cooperative act compatible with the legal framework that will ensure sufficient prosecution and sanction of convicted pirates. The legal framework has seen results through more unity and resources between states and organizations, with Germany, Greece, and the US pledging assistance in the building of legal infrastructure within Somalia itself, which is the crucial long-term solution for piracy. Germany has also taken leadership by enacting the only known domestic universal jurisdiction law specifically targeted at crimes against humanity through maritime piracy. Unfortunately, however, recent budget cuts in Germany will see resources for a global campaign against piracy decreased, which illustrates the legal framework’s dependency on continuing long-term commitment from the numerous parties involved. This will be a difficult task for various states as there may be a clash with national interests, particularly if a state has larger interests in its support for piracy-ridden poor states, not to mention that time may show that certain aspects of the legal framework are in need of reform measures difficult to achieve with greater numbers of stakeholders. High adaptability and resilience will be required of the legal framework, but with effective law enforcement cooperation now seen as no less than a necessity before the seas become yet more dangerous, it will not be allowed to fail easily.
2.1 Legal Framework for Cooperation
The primary legal basis for international law enforcement cooperation in combating modern piracy is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). Through UNCLOS, piracy is universally defined and even more critically, it provides a legal and jurisdictional framework for which states can take law enforcement action on the high seas. The definition outlined in UNCLOS Article 101 is crucial in the fight against piracy and is an evolution of the customary international law definition. This provides a basis for legal systems globally to effectively prosecute pirates. The clarification of what constitutes the “high seas” and the jurisdictional rules of engagement are also important as they provide a framework for conducting operations and making arrests with respect to a state’s laws. Article 105 of UNCLOS provides a clear definition of pirates and their status as “hostis humani generis” (enemies of all mankind); this provision however is seen by some as a double-edged sword due to the fact that it requires all nations to cooperate in the repression of piracy and by doing so relinquish any nationalistic claims to pirates. However, the reality of this situation is hard to define as often nations are hesitant to commit resources to an international operation and a number of regional agreements for piracy cooperation have evolved around nationalistic undertones. The final key provision is found in Article 110 which allows for the cooperation of any state in suppressing piracy and as the only clause in UNCLOS that allows for the invocation of universal jurisdiction by all states, this provision facilitates the legal action of many states. The importance of UNCLOS was reiterated in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 15 June 2010 and the Security Council Resolution 1950 (2010) which recognize the jurisdiction of states in regionally based law enforcement actions principally in Somali waters. This specifically calls states to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia which has been seen as an explicit authorization for intervention.
2.2 Role of Regional Organizations
Reaction to growing incidences of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden has witnessed the operationalization of numerous regional organizations. An important role has been played by these organizations through information, debate, and dialogue, underrating the dimension of the problem and Nelson its threats to regional security. The regional growth of maritime security centers in Singapore, Malaysia, and other countries in the region are indicative of the seriousness and concern that the regional states have in combating maritime piracy. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and FRANCE PACIFIC (FPDA) have analyzed and discussed the regional piracy problem and its organizational culture. The Saint Vincent Declaration termed the piracy case as a credible threat to the global economy and the security of the regional states. In adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and in an attempt to seek United Nations intervention, regional organizations like the League of Arab States have requested a UN mandate for pursuing pirates till the Somali coast and arresting and trying them under internationally recognized legal jurisdiction. UN Security Council resolutions 1816 and its successor resolutions 1838, 1846, 1851, 1891, and 1918 have called and been persistent with greater cooperation between states and regional organizations in combating maritime piracy. These resolutions have deeply resonated with the sentiment of regional organizations, and many have sent a plea for assistance to the UN for the operations conducted by state or combined naval task forces. The matter of regional organizations playing a direct role in combating piracy and providing socio-economic aid to Somalia or Puntland and forming international public-private partnerships for change hands on previous issues have been the subject of tremendous debate and discourse.
2.3 Technological Advancements in Maritime Security
While prevention through the use of technology is a positive step for reducing the level of piracy in the long term, it is the second category of technology that is of most importance to ships that are currently at risk of pirate attacks.
Intelligence-led technology used to prevent piracy attacks comes in many forms and is often shared amongst nations and agencies involved in international law enforcement cooperation. Information captured from satellites can be useful for tracking the location of suspect pirate gangs along the coasts in failed states such as Somalia, thus giving an idea of where land-based military intervention might be needed. Intelligence information can also be used to establish a pattern linking released convicted pirates to further offenses, thus justifying longer prison sentences for the most habitual offenders.
Measures such as these are most effective when based on intelligence information regarding the types of attack pirates are likely to carry out, and where and when they are likely to occur. The implementation of a Best Management Practices (BMP) scheme by the shipping industry has been partially successful in this regard, providing commercial ships with guidance on basic safety and security measures that can be implemented to help avoid, deter, or delay piracy attacks.
In terms of the former, various forms of technology can have an effect on deterring potential criminals from attempting to carry out piracy attacks. An example of this would be the use of anti-piracy private security contractors on board ships in the high-risk area, which has become a growing industry since piracy became a significant issue. While controversy continues to surround the legalities and practicalities of having armed security forces onboard ships, there has been a measurable decrease in the amount of successful piracy attacks on ships that utilize these services. This suggests that at least in some cases, having armed security onboard acts as a successful deterrent.
One might argue that technology is the key to overcoming any security issue, and in the context of addressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden, there is a strong case to support this viewpoint. There have been many significant advancements in the technology available in recent years aimed at tackling various forms of maritime crime, largely driven by security concerns resulting from the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Technology itself can be split into two different categories when considered from a security perspective. The first involves the use of technology to prevent an incident from occurring, while the second involves technology being used to help deal with an incident if preventative measures fail.
3. Case Studies: Successes and Challenges
Operation Atalanta represents yet another significant CTF in terms of the development of CTF 151. It is an EU military mission “established in late 2008 to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia. By December 2016, the operation had offered protection to more than 50 World Food Programme ships delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and had deterred and intervened to stop a number of piracy attacks.” EU NAVFOR’s main aim is to escort vulnerable vessels (mainly World Food Programme, African Union and AMISOM shipping) with the desired end state of the deterrence and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery. EU NAVFOR has been successful in reducing the number of attacks significantly and adrift merchant vessels attacked. This has primarily been done by developing a 2-tier counter-piracy strategy. This strategy involves maintaining a naval presence off the coast of Somalia to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery on commercial vessels, combined with providing protection to WFP shipping and vulnerable vessels. EU NAVFOR has contributed well to the CTF approach by providing a level of high tactical control and ensuring that allocation of forces in the impacted areas has led to naval action on any suspected pirates. This has been significantly supported by the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa, a sub-entity of EU NAVFOR, which provides around-the-clock information coordination of maritime activity in the region. Despite these successes of EU NAVFOR CTF actions, EU NAVFOR has not provided a handover of suspected pirates to Somali authorities. This issue has arisen from legal technicalities involving human rights issues and the transfer of suspected pirates to face trial in EU countries. EU NAVFOR has subsequently evolved its strategy in 2016, implementing Operation Atlanta 2. This operation will shift EU NAVFOR’s focus away from the tactical level direct action on pirates towards the disruption of the land bases and associated logistical networks which are the facilitators of piracy. This new strategy will draw upon Afghanistan and Iraqi military experiences which mirrored similar approaches. Success in this strategy will require collaboration with AMISOM and UN by the development of a legal framework for the prevention of a re-rooting of piracy and armed robbery acts. Although EU NAVFOR had ceased its mission at the end of 2016, it has left a significant impact within the international community. It serves as an example of strategic success within a CTF framework, and its transition from a sea-based strategy to land-based actions may be pivotal in the future in reducing piracy in Somalia.
3.1 Operation Atalanta: European Union Naval Force
Operation Atalanta is the most significant recent development in an international response to piracy. Launched in 2008 under the aegis of the European Union, the operation has played a crucial role in reducing attacks in the Gulf. Normally, the naval assets of the European Union are under the command of Operation Commanders from the EU member state which currently holds the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council. In the case of Operation Atalanta, it was decided that a British Royal Navy 2-star flag officer would be appointed as the first Operation Commander. This decision was taken because the operation had developed directly from earlier work done under the auspices of NATO and the officer appointed had been the Deputy Commander of Combined Maritime Forces and Deputy Commander of the NATO Allied Maritime Command, both of which are key international naval military staff appointments. The aim was to provide a military leader with a thorough understanding of NATO, EU, and UN counter-piracy doctrine and commanding experience in relevant areas. This would ensure maximum coordination with NATO and friendly forces in the region, a factor which is particularly important when maritime patrol aircraft and naval units from many nations may be transiting through the area. Additionally, the force provider for the operational HQ and the majority of the assets involved were to be drawn from a six-month rotation of the EU’s most capable naval contributors, namely France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. During the UK’s six-month term as Lead Nation for the operation in 2009, the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) was established in Northwood, UK, and this arrangement remained in place until December 2013. This arrangement has ensured that the deputy commander and many key staff appointments in the OHQ have been drawn from officers of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command, thereby continuing the close involvement of NATO in the successive stages of Operation Atalanta. For instance, one of the Operation Commanders later became the Deputy Commander Allied Maritime Command. Due to the practice of “double-hatting” appointments with personnel from the EU military staff, the Operation Commanders have had firsthand access to an excellent coordination channel with the EU military staff and the EU Military Committee throughout the operation. This has greatly facilitated the coordination of EU military capabilities with other international military efforts off Somalia. At all times, the Operation Commanders have maintained active liaison with the UN Political Office for Somalia and the Contact Group off the Coast of Somalia.
3.2 Combined Task Force 151: International Counter-Piracy Coalition
Since the international community recognised the importance of the seas as a medium of communication and the need to protect international shipping and trade, maritime safety and security has received comprehensive attention at the international level. Over time, “maritime safety and security” have come to be interlinked and often united in terminology. Safety implements to prevent accidental damage to the environment or the people involved in shipping, it assumes that intentional acts are covered elsewhere. The safety and security of shipping is dependent upon the prevention of human acts, it is the removal of the threat of malicious damage to people and property. It is the ISPS code which deals with maritime security and it is in this area where requirements for international law enforcement can be found. Emerging from its small scale start in the 17th century, the concept of maritime security has led to the establishment of a number of national coast guards and several hundred marine police agencies. However, the threats posed by piracy, armed robbery, and terrorist acts in today’s world constantly remind nations that in a global industry such as shipping, national measures are inefficient. This is particularly evident in Somalia’s piracy plagued waters where even the combined appointed naval forces of United Nations Security Council charter can barely police beyond coastal waters. Steps must be taken to synergize their efforts and there is no stronger way of doing this than through the use of international law enforcement. During time of war or in the event of crime, it has been the grand strategy of many nations to commit their forces into a coalition with a like-minded goal. It is apparent in current perception that sea blindness has caused politico-military manoeuvres to take backseat status to economic and diplomatic actions. Yet, as recently as a year ago and considering the failures of purely naval means to solve problems of the sea, there are many who would quest that a policy of sea power has never been discontinued!
3.3 Challenges Faced by Law Enforcement Agencies
Operation Atalanta and CTF 151 and other naval force operations are widely supported and believed to be the most effective measures in reducing piracy in the short-term. However, in recent years there have been increased reports of pirates simply moving operations to other areas of the Somali coast approximately 1,000 miles in either direction. Although there has been a marked decrease on the east coast of Africa, it is suspected that pirates are simply outwitting the international community and showing a great deal of flexibility and adaptation to naval forces. It is believed that with the recent effectiveness of naval force operations, pirates are less willing to travel far distances to hijack ships and thus pirates have turned to local fishermen to act as sea taxis to transport them to mother ships waiting off the coast. This in itself poses another problem, as fishermen have been arrested in mistaken identity, as it is difficult to differentiate between pirates using fishing vessels and actual fishermen. This has led to more allegations against forces for human rights violations. An example of this comes in a somewhat controversial move as the Japanese government has prohibited its forces to engage in any ship that they cannot confirm is an actual pirate ship.
4. Recommendations for Enhancing Cooperation
Moreover, there is a concern about the humane treatment of pirates and the legality of transferring suspects to states where they could face the death penalty. In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that there was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights when France transferred Somali pirates to Kenya. Consequently, these legal issues have led to a disincentive to enforce and prosecute pirates who are often released when there is deemed to be insufficient evidence to prosecute. This, in turn, has led to a perception of impunity, thus exacerbating the problem of piracy. The adoption of legal frameworks and agreements amongst states will assist in eradicating these ambiguities and create a more effective and coordinated approach to the judicial process of prosecuting pirates.
Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a primary issue lies with the lack of prosecution and enforcement against pirates. The Copenhagen Joint Declaration of the Meeting of States off the Coast of Somalia provided a platform in which around 50 states shared strategies, ideas, and possible legal frameworks for the prosecution of piracy. However, there is an urgent need for an agreement or treaty that will provide clarity on the matter of which state has the jurisdiction to prosecute pirates. In the past, there have been situations where states have apprehended suspected pirates and then had to release them because it was unclear whether they had jurisdiction to prosecute.
Strengthening legal mechanisms
4.1 Strengthening Legal Mechanisms
Linked to this, it has been suggested that the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal for the prosecution of pirates would be effective, as domestic courts and internationally existing mechanisms such as ITLOS and the ICJ are often slow, require large amounts of evidence, and have reluctance to take on universal jurisdiction cases. An international tribunal would be faster, more reliable, and cost-effective, and would include an element of incorporating punishment of pirates into the overall solution of preventing piracy. The effectiveness of this tribunal would be in providing a deterrent. Currently, pirates are often released by states due to reluctance to use universal jurisdiction and fear of enforcing the death penalty. Thus, pirates reoffend with impunity. An international tribunal with guarantees of humane treatment and a lack of the death penalty may be the catalyst for change in this respect.
Several legal mechanisms which would enhance cooperation have been cited as useful in combating maritime piracy. Ratification and implementation of international treaties, agreements, and conventions is high on the agenda regarding legal initiatives, with a particular emphasis on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The importance of UNCLOS cannot be understated, providing the legal framework for the high seas, the resource that pirates seek to plunder. If adhered to and implemented effectively, UNCLOS would make it increasingly difficult for pirates to escape justice; though as noted previously, the challenge remains in persuading states to act in the common interest and not their individual interest.
4.2 Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence
International law enforcement cooperation in combating maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden can be promoted through several different channels. Information sharing is a key precursor to joint law enforcement operations and maximizing the potential effectiveness of both. In this respect, information exchange can range from sharing general knowledge on piracy trends to specific modus operandi of pirate action groups. Given the transient nature of the piracy “problem” in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, it is important that there be a free flow of information between states and international organizations at all levels. The multilateral sharing of information between law enforcement agencies through a centralized database would be an effective way of promoting information exchange. In the initial stages, this could simply be a database of contact details for relevant agencies and points of contact. Subsequent progression would involve the sharing of intelligence reports and analysis in order to provide a platform for joint operations and coordination. An information exchange network should also extend to the shipping industry and relevant private companies. In formalizing information exchange, diplomatic efforts should be made to promote the free flow of sensitive security information by removing classification and caveat restrictions between certain state parties. This is significant as there are disparities in trust and cooperation between different states and regions.
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) is a policing model that has proved to be effective in the law enforcement of specific criminal activities and the apprehension of known offenders. It is a relatively new concept in comparison to the traditional reactive model of policing and involves the strategic utilization of information and analysis to direct operational policing decisions. In the context of piracy, it can be said that many interdiction efforts in the High Risk Area (HRA) by naval forces have been sporadic and disjointed, with an emphasis on deterrence and disruption. Effects-based operations have seen some success in temporarily suppressing piracy activity, though the root causes and inhibiting factors have not been substantially addressed. An ILP approach to maritime piracy would involve a solid intelligence intake on piracy trends, the development of a comprehensive understanding of the piracy environment, and consistent data-driven law enforcement operations to dismantle pirate action groups and their operations. This will require a significant intelligence network and the coordination of state and non-state actors to share and integrate intelligence.
4.3 Capacity Building and Training Initiatives
With a view to increasing both regional and international capacity to deal with piracy, training and mentoring initiatives must be advanced in Somalia and further afield. This will involve building naval capacity in neighbouring states which may not in itself contribute directly to state building in Somalia yet is a vital part of wider maritime security in the region. Coastal and maritime security training for Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles and Tanzania should be coordinated and monitored to ensure it directly addresses the threat of piracy and is not lost in wider security sector reform programming. Security sector reform is essential in Somalia and perhaps in the long term the most effective way to make the seas off Somalia safer. This will be a long and complex process and one which will require a coordinated approach with the international community and the Somali authorities. However, in the short term, the obvious and immediate impact measures, naval capacity building in the region and ship rider agreements will serve to contain and reduce the current level of piracy. The availability of military forces to protect WFP shipments into Somalia is also critical. This is complicated by the potential counterproductive impact of using force to deny an essential source of revenue to many local communities in Somalia. Therefore, force in this role needs to be coupled with regional aid and development initiatives aimed at providing alternative livelihoods and income sources to combat the war economy in Somalia. This however is a wider debate which is beyond the scope of this paper. Onshore development and regional aid initiatives should be part of a wider dialogue on the future security and stability of the region.
4.4 Collaboration with Private Sector and Non-Governmental Organizations
The private military industry has grown significantly over the past twenty years. While it has received vast criticism, there has been an increase in the practice of regulations and standards that adhere to international law. Furthermore, there is an increasing trend of states to engage private military companies to carry out both combat and non-combat military support functions. The UK government, for example, has awarded Aegis Defence Services a contract to carry out various security services in Iraq. A similar concept was proposed by the Eritrean government at the Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories’ meeting in 2009. Eritrea proposed using private military companies to protect the shipping lanes of the region. This proposal was met with significant criticism and has potential major repercussions. Yet the reality is that private military companies are committed to protecting their clients’ assets and would provide a viable immediate solution to the security issues the report has addressed. Although deemed unpalatable by many, we must recognize the repercussions of these actions if not adopted by states. If there is insufficient improvement in security and piracy continues to plague the region, transnational corporations will invest elsewhere and coastal states will lose potential income and resources from these investors.
The most innovative and perhaps contentious of the research findings and recommendations relate to the collaboration with private sector and non-governmental organizations. While funding to combat piracy is generous, the structure and processes regarding the disbursement and allocation of funds are inefficient and ineffective. The lack of clear directives and mismanagement of funds has resulted in little progress in developing sustainable capabilities that adequately address the threat of piracy. The development of private and public partnerships would provide a legitimate and structured avenue for the disbursement of funds. This would involve recruiting private security companies and involve transnational corporations investing in the area to provide funds or resources to specific coastal states.

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