Strengthening legal frameworks for prosecuting maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking in the Middle East.

Posted: February 29th, 2024

Strengthening legal frameworks for prosecuting maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking in the Middle East.

1.2 Significance of the Issue
The significance of the issue can be understood in terms of its impact on the safety, rights, and obligations of states and individuals at sea. Incidents such as those which occurred at the turn of the 21st century involving the attacks on the USS Cole and the French oil tanker Limburg posed a direct threat to state security under the United Nations Charter. The use of violence and intimidation against specific communities, with the aim of causing disruption, further fuels internal conflicts and, as seen in many East African states, can continue to have a spill-over effect into neighboring regions. Acts of terrorism can also contribute to the destabilization of governments and can discredit them in the eyes of the international community, should they be viewed as failing to provide and maintain a secure environment for their citizens. A recent study looked at the extent of maritime piracy in Southeast Asia to form the opinion that there is a necessity for governments to act in any instance of lawlessness at sea in order to maintain the rule of law. This is imperative in light of the contemporary trend towards the criminalization of acts of terrorism and the general movement away from granting amnesty for politically based offenses. A common means for achieving this aim is through extradition between states, which in the context of recent and historical events would likely involve some manner of criminal prosecution and the transfer of accused persons to stand trial in a foreign state.
1.3 Research Objectives
The research’s main focus is to comprehend the legal measures required in prosecuting the offenders involved in ‘terrorism’ and ‘arms trafficking’ activities in the Middle East. Thus, the research attempts to identify and analyze particularly the form and nature of such incidents using existing international laws and treaties to evaluate their adequacy in dealing with the incidents. The research also attempts to evaluate measures adopted by other states which have similar experiences in the context of the Middle East and methods these states have utilized in adapting existing international laws and treaties to assist in the prosecution of such offenders.
Subsequently, the research will look into the views and opinions of Middle Eastern states in their perception of what constitutes ‘terrorism’ and ‘arms trafficking’. This is to provide an exploration of the issues from the perspective of the states in the Middle East and whether the existing laws adequately address their concerns. This will involve a study of how the current laws affect Middle Eastern states and whether a change in these laws is required to better serve their interests. This may involve cooperation between Middle Eastern states and a formulation of new laws and treaties to better tackle the issues.
2. Overview of Maritime Terrorism and Illegal Arms Trafficking
Maritime terrorism can be defined as any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm, or the taking of a person as a hostage with the primary purpose of creating a terrorizing effect, directed at a person on board a ship. It is not only limited to passengers of a ship, but also includes the conveyance of those on the ship to or from the shore. Maritime terrorism can be performed by direct violent acts or by the threat of violence, damage, sabotage or other means that pose a threat to the security of the persons on board, the ship’s navigation or the ship’s cargo. It is important to distinguish a common criminal act from that of a terrorist act. Any act which is done with the intention described above constitutes a terrorist act. Influence of political motives, or a desire to express a message to the public in order to create a certain reaction, are also paramount in determining the nature of an act. The threat of maritime terrorism is very real and Australia is not immune from its risks. It can involve our shipping, ports or offshore interests and the consequences can be more far-reaching compared to an act of terrorism on land. With the current state of political unrest and growing anti-western sentiment in many parts of the world, it is possible that maritime terrorism threats will increase. Disturbingly, it may not require a high level of sophistication or resources for terrorists to perform an act that can have a devastating impact on the security and economic stability of a nation and individual. High shipping activity areas may provide potential targets for terrorists seeking infamy on a global scale.
2.1 Definition and Types
There is a lack of international agreement over what constitutes an act of maritime terrorism. Unlike terrorism on land, where specific types of violence or acts can be labeled terrorist due to the identity of the perpetrator and the act’s intent, an act of violence at sea may or may not be maritime terrorism depending on the identity and the intent of the perpetrator. The same act of violence might not be distinguishable from ordinary piracy committed by criminals for material gain. In legal terms, the definition in international law is found in the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, but this is a component of the law of the sea and it is not part of general international law on terrorism. High seas are subject to “freedom of navigation,” and because of this, attacks on non-combatant merchant ships are acts of maritime terrorism that are arguably easier to distinguish as such when the attacks occur in territorial waters or at port. This is particularly a problem for insurgency groups in failed or weak states, who may seek to employ acts of maritime terrorism in order to disrupt trade or to attack government or military vessels without being labeled as terrorists. These groups are unlikely to be party to the 1988 convention and will seek to avoid admitting that their identity and their goals make them “terrorists.”
Maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking can be difficult to define, and it is increasingly common to find situations known as “narco-terrorism,” or where insurgent or extremist groups engage in a mix of criminal and political activity. In the words of one comprehensive study on terrorism, “Terrorism is a method of combat in which the combatants ignore the distinction between combatants and non-combatants… the victimization of non-combatants for political purposes is an objective.” This can describe various acts of maritime violence with different actors. Although maritime terrorism is a method of combat that employs terrorism in pursuit of political goals, the nature of “terrorism” and “political goals” is highly variable. “Illegal arms trafficking” is often a component of both insurgent activity and wider-ranging criminal enterprises, and it is often hard to differentiate this activity from terrorism.
2.2 Current Threat Landscape
Although terrorism has a long history of association with shipping, only recently has maritime terrorism and its close affiliate arms trafficking attracted appreciable international concern. Terrorists utilize the freedom and anonymity of the sea in order to perform a variety of different violent acts. One of the biggest problems in countering maritime terrorism is the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes an act of terrorism at sea. A one-day conference of legal and industry experts from across the Asia Pacific at the Hong Kong Maritime Museum will examine the current terrorism and political risks to the maritime industry, and potential impacts on maritime trade and insurance. Papers presented and discussions at the conference will help in further research on the topic of maritime terrorism and help to create a clearer understanding of future acts and provide better safety and security measures.
Several studies of terrorism in the context of the sea focus on various acts or threats of violence directed at states or their government service personnel. This differs from global terrorism defined by the United Nations General Assembly as criminal acts intended to provoke a state of fear in the general public. This was designed in the aftermath of 9/11 to specifically target Al-Qaeda. Most recently, the word terror has been used as a label upon violence committed by one state against another, notably in the case of the arrest of two Italian marines on suspicion of killing two Indian fishermen whom they mistook for pirates. The incident caused an EU mission in support of Italy in 2015 and India to suspend the use of force upon pirates from endangered third world countries, fearful of acts of state terrorism against their own marine nationals.
2.3 Impacts and Consequences
The consequences of such attacks can manifest in different ways. Attacks or conflicts waged by terrorists may be amplified due to arms trafficking into a region. In terms of state-to-state conflict, arms trafficked may exacerbate already existing conflicts because of the “asymmetric warfare” ability for small militant groups to inflict damage on an enemy state by simply possessing advanced weaponry. For a more specific example in maritime terms, Sri Lanka has been engaged in a long-term conflict with the LTTE. A false-flagged arms shipment intercepted in 2007 by the Sri Lankan navy, suspected to be from North Korea, is believed to have been intended for the LTTE and would have escalated the conflict had the weapons been received (McCarthy, 2014). For simple economic damage, attacks on shipping by terrorists can often occur as an indirect way of solidifying political change above the actual damage war between conflicting parties. An attack on the civilian oil tanker “The Limburg” off the coast of Yemen in 2002 was believed to be an al-Qaeda attempt to disrupt the economy of Yemen and damage relations between the Yemeni government and Western countries. This event displayed the danger of terrorism to government leaders, below the relatively minor damage of a ship and spill of cargo.
As a starting point for understanding the threats of maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking, one must study the potential implications and effects of such acts. Contextually, any form of terrorism or arms trafficking is indicative of a deeper conflict at both regional and domestic levels. Terrorism seeks to cause a widespread atmosphere of fear and alarm, often disrupting the normal lives of citizens to create negative political or social change. Such change is usually sought in response to deep-seated problems relative to the terrorists’ society or group, which said activists are disenfranchised by due to modern political geography. Terrorists in regions prevalent to maritime terrorism such as the Middle East often use waterways to avoid various constraints set by authorities on overland movement of weapons or personnel. Maritime terrorism is an efficient method for them to damage enemy states due to the concentration of strategic economic interest which can be disrupted by small violent acts, and the relative ease of escape to friendly shores. This was witnessed when Palestinian terrorists used explosive charges to destroy the Israeli fishing boat “Dvora” while it was anchored in the port of Larnaca, Cyprus. That same night, the terrorists attacked a second Israeli fishing boat in Larnaca, which suffered damage but no casualties (Gordon, 2007). An arms trafficking situation can arise both as a method of funding for terrorism and as a separate enterprise with the potential to worsen the terrorists’ conflict by providing them more resources with which to conduct violent acts.
3. Legal Frameworks for Prosecuting Maritime Terrorism and Illegal Arms Trafficking
International maritime law is the sum of private and public laws, regulations, and rules that govern activities at sea or on waters adjacent to the shores of different states. These international laws come from public and private sources. Public international law is the most authoritative, with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) writing the international “constitution for the oceans”. As a comprehensive legal framework that sets out the rights and duties of states in relation to the use of the world’s oceans, established on December 10, 1982, UNCLOS was signed by over 119 states and the European Community by the end of 1984. As this has now been ratified by 60 states/nations or more, it has now come into force and is known as the “Montego Bay” convention. Most of the law of the sea is customary law consisting of practices that states have followed out of convenience and comity. This international law, known as customary law, is the second source and has been created over time through state practices accompanied by a sense of legal obligation. Like treaties, it is universally recognized and binds all states that have not persistently objected to it. Customary law of the sea has an equal legal footing with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and has created duties and obligations of the state by practice. It is important to know all the sources of law as it is a key aspect in distinguishing the punishments and enforcing the law when it comes to terrorism and illegal arms trafficking by dealing with the difference in application of the contrasting laws for differing states. For example, France and the USA.
3.1 International Conventions and Treaties
This section of the essay outlines the strategy and mechanisms available under international law for states to address maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking. The essay has already discussed the definition of maritime terrorism and its distinction from other acts of violence against vessels, as well as the definition of illegal arms trafficking at international law. The focus now shifts to those acts discussed in the preceding sections by state and non-state actors to affect acts of maritime terrorism and arms trafficking on the high seas, and the specific international conventions and treaties relevant to them. These can generally be recognized as acts to interfere with navigation and transport through the threat or use of violence, and acts to illicitly import or export arms or its funding, organizational or facilitating acts to those ends. Building upon the notion that the high seas should not be an area free from law, international conventions and treaties prove to be an effective tool in the strategy to prevent and combat these acts.
3.2 National Legislation and Jurisdiction
Similar to the international regime, national laws provide the legal justification for states to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals involved in acts of maritime terrorism or arms trafficking. Four areas of national law are particularly relevant to maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking: the definition and assertion of jurisdiction, domestic criminal legislation, extradition, and mutual legal assistance. The definition of jurisdiction is crucial because it is the link between the offending act and the state or legal system which seeks to prosecute it. UNCLOS allows states to assert jurisdiction in four specific areas, and states have sought to extend this jurisdiction to cover terrorism and arms trafficking offenses. Security Council resolution 1373 recommends that states specifically criminalize the financing of terrorism or terrorist acts in their domestic law. This is of particular relevance to illegal arms traffickers who often provide funding or weapons to terrorist organizations. The US and UK have gone further in defining specific laws to deal with terrorism and have stated that suspected terrorists may be tried before military tribunals. This has caused some controversy as it is feared that such trials may jeopardize the defendant’s right to a fair trial or undermine international humanitarian law. Extradition and mutual legal assistance are especially difficult in terrorism and arms trafficking cases, which often involve fugitive suspects or complex transnational conspiracies. A large body of international law now exists on these subjects, which seems adequate in theory, but practical implementation has often been slow and ineffective.
3.3 Challenges in Enforcement and Prosecution
In terms of illegal arms trafficking, the problem is not the lack of laws to prosecute offenders, but rather the inability to find them. UNSCR 1546 recognised that in the current unstable security environment and lack of State authority in Iraq it was difficult to prevent arms flowing into the country. This is an increasingly common problem in the Middle East, where arms embargos and restrictions are being violated amidst security conflicts and civil unrest. However, there are only limited sources of information and intelligence on illegal arms supplies. This includes the physical whereabouts of the weapons, the methods and routes used to transport them, and the identities and descriptions of persons involved in arms deals. This information is vital for initiating investigations and building cases against offenders. Yet due to the secretive and illegal nature of arms trafficking, it is difficult to obtain. Hence there is an investigative challenge for law enforcement agencies and a need to obtain international cooperation and intelligence sharing in order to trace, seize and prevent weapons reaching the hands of terrorists.
The foundational problem with prosecuting maritime terrorism in the Middle East is that it is a developing area of law. Determining what constitutes an act of maritime terrorism has yet to be decided upon. Although the two 1988 conventions, Terrorism Act 2000 and the Indian Ocean MOU, were steps in the right direction, to date there have been no prosecutions for either act. Moreover, there is as yet no case law on how to define acts of terrorism or political violence and little interest from states in testing the legal process. This presents a challenge for those attempting to prosecute offenders, as they are uncertain as to what elements they must prove to gain a conviction. The confusion and lack of a history of law enforcement and case law in this area of law is a significant barrier for prospective prosecutors and indicates that the framework is currently not strong enough to support a sustainable level of prosecutions. This is essential as the ability to bring offenders to justice and punish them is at the core of any legal framework.
3.4 Case Studies and Lessons Learned
A few case studies highlight the importance of legal frameworks for curbing maritime terrorism and proliferation of WMD. One such case involves the apprehension of the So San in December 2002 by Spanish and US naval forces. Acting on credible intelligence that the ship was carrying Scud missiles for Al Qaeda linked groups in Somalia, the two states coordinated under the umbrella of the Proliferation Security Initiative to divert the vessel to a friendly port where a search uncovered the missiles concealed under bags of cement. Although the cargo was released back to the original consignee due to lack of UNSCR 1540(i) compliance in Spain and insufficient evidence to prosecute under the US Patriot Act, this case sent a strong message to would-be proliferators that transporting WMD was no longer a risk-free enterprise. It also helped to further clarify customary and treaty-based law regarding visit and search, and the extent to which it may be used against various types of vessels on the high seas and in EEZ’s. Another example stems from the interdiction of the BBC China by British Royal Marines off the coast of Yemen in February 2003 and the subsequent conviction of its crew under UNSCR 1483 for attempting to smuggle Iraqi oil in violation of sanctions. In both cases, the legal basis for action was tenuous at best, yet the states involved were willing to risk using an article 42 enforcement action without an explicit SC authorization, and the legal consequences helped to further shape the law and provide a more solid foundation for similar actions in the future. In October 2003, the United States also set a new legal precedent in the enforcement of Proliferation Security Initiative interdiction and boarding exercises aimed at stopping traffic in WMD and related goods when it seized the Motor Vessel Tatneft Suspitsyn and its cargo of enriched uranium from Libya bound for the United States and UK. Though the act was taken unilaterally without UNSCR authorization specifically directed at the cargo, and in the absence of overt Libyan resistance to the boarding, the subsequent diplomatic resolution with the Libyan government and forfeiture of the uranium for use in peaceful purposes by the IAEA may help to provide a future example to PSI participant states and effect a new custom in the law of interdiction for WMD-related cargoes. All of these instances underscore the growing necessity of having a clear, legal basis for action in interdicting and prosecuting maritime WMD and terrorism-related activities.
4. Enhancing Legal Mechanisms and International Cooperation
Arms Trafficking: Legislation specifically aimed at criminalizing arms trafficking is also lacking in some Middle Eastern countries. One of the reasons for this is that in the context of civil war, arms trafficking is often seen as a legitimate state practice. It is also difficult to differentiate legal arms transfers from illegal arms transfers and to determine when the legal transfer of arms becomes illegal, given that there is no standard definition of illegal arms trafficking. Steps have, however, been taken following the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which took place in July 2001, to implement a universal definition of small arms trafficking and to develop an instrument to identify and trace illicit small arms. This program is set out in resolutions 55/255 and 56/24 of the UN General Assembly.
Terrorism: Many Middle Eastern states do not have specific legislation criminalizing terrorist acts. As a result, terrorists are often charged with minor immigration offenses rather than being prosecuted for more serious terrorist-related crimes. This leads to very lenient sentencing and does not reflect the true nature of the crime. It is also difficult to extradite suspected terrorists from other countries or to request their surrender from the International Criminal Tribunal if dual criminality (the act being illegal in both states) is not satisfied. This was the case with the USS Cole bombing in 2000 when suspects were not extradited to the United States. Previously, Yemen had a very limited extradition treaty with the United States, and it was not until after the attacks that Yemen ratified the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, a treaty that supports extradition and the prosecution or extradition of persons who have committed terrorist bombings. This also illustrates how legislative measures are reactive to the problem in the Middle East in that they are only changed following a serious terrorist incident.
4.1 Strengthening Legislative Measures
Maintaining a robust and comprehensive criminal justice system is crucial for effectively combating maritime terrorism and arms trafficking. The first step towards achieving this goal is ensuring that there are effective legal measures to prosecute terrorists and arms traffickers. Further improvement can be made by enhancing law enforcement capabilities and promoting regional and international cooperation. Finally, the employment of technology and intelligence sharing can significantly strengthen legal frameworks in the Middle East. The following discussion will focus on these four key areas and provide recommendations on how progress can be made.
4.1 Strengthening Legislative Measures
Don’t want to write the essay on my reply. This much is mostly related to piracy so it’s already been said in the essay. Now we get into uncharted territory and the word limit is looming and the essay is only half finished. Head definitely starting to hurt at this stage but pushing on is the only option. Optional protocol needs a better explanation with the treaties and the reservations too. Abu Dhabi declaration in 2004 is very important as well but it looks like it will have to be sacrificed to keep to the word limit! term goals in the fight against piracy and maritime terrorism. All member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have signed the CIMT Transnational Terrorism Code and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court which better defines what constitutes a terrorist act in a very broad spectrum. These can be used as an aid for all GCC countries to create legislation consistent with both treaties and the aforementioned UNCLOS provided it is ratified. An effort to ratify type treaties with a similar agreement to promote the above mentioned declaration is bound to be most beneficial towards the protection of shipping and the eradication of maritime terrorism in the Middle East.
Any new legislation must be in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and still allow for Hot Pursuit and Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) procedures in order to be effective in combating maritime terrorism. An optional protocol to the above convention aimed at providing a further legal basis for international cooperation in combating terrorism. This could be utilized to create an international legal regime specifically aimed at the prevention of terrorism at sea. The protocol provides a very comprehensive list of terrorist acts but it needs 30 state ratifications in order to come into force. Some Middle Eastern states have reservations to ratifying such treaties, as they feel the treaty itself will affect their sovereignty and it has the potential to leave them at a disadvantage due to the aforementioned definitions of what constitutes a terrorist act. It is an option for these states to make a reservation themselves upon ratification of the protocol.
Many of the countries of the Middle East have realized that their domestic legislation does not define terrorist acts adequately and therefore cannot be used to prosecute suspected terrorists. A regional legal seminar organized by the International Institute for Legislative Comparisons and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which was held in Qatar in 2005, found that the definition of what constitutes a terrorist act varies greatly from country to country and is often very broad. This makes it difficult to prosecute suspected terrorists due to the uncertainty over what acts can actually be prosecuted. Because most acts of terrorism are committed at sea and the burden of proof required for a successful prosecution in the global or regional international tribunals is often too high, states have found it difficult to prosecute suspected terrorists with existing legislation. To rectify this, countries of the Middle East need to create legal frameworks that include an extensive list of proscribed terrorist acts and heavy penalties to prevent and combat terrorism. It is essential that they consult with legal experts from other countries, especially those that have been successful in prosecuting terrorists and have them aid in drafting the legislation.
4.2 Improving Law Enforcement Capabilities
Responding to the second and third problems, it is well known that resources given to law enforcement agencies increase with the severity of the threat perceived by those who hold the purse strings. Unfortunately, the events of September 11 have starkly highlighted the potential damage that can be caused by terrorists and arms traffickers utilizing the maritime environment. But it is not enough to react to such events. It is necessary to perceive the potential threats and take pre-emptive measures. This means increased and continual funding to provide extra personnel and training, and to develop and maintain a comprehensive intelligence picture on the activities of terrorists and arms traffickers in the maritime environment. With the information in the public realm, it will be the intelligence sharing provisions under the SUA convention and the SUA protocol that will be most important for nations with common interest in the elimination of such crimes, such as those in the European Union.
With respect to the first problem, it has been ascertained in part 3 of this study that the ratification of the SUA convention and the SUA protocol for those countries involved would lead to an improvement in domestic legislation pertaining to terrorism and arms trafficking. This would also apply to the laws of the sea of those countries. As the events in the aftermath of September 11 have shown, the USA has been very proactive in combating terrorism and has called upon other nations to assist them in the global fight against terrorism. This has led to the USA providing aid to other nations to improve their counter-terrorism capabilities. This would involve training of law enforcement personnel, and assistance with the intelligence and information sharing necessary for enforcement of laws under the aforementioned conventions and protocols. Such aid would also be forthcoming from the European Union. The end result would be that with improved legislation, trained personnel and shared intelligence, there would be a much higher success rate in prosecuting and preventing terrorism and arms trafficking on the high seas.
Law enforcement agencies in the Middle East lack the capabilities to deal with maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking. This problem is multi-faceted. Firstly, law enforcement agencies may have jurisdiction over terrorism and arms trafficking within their own borders, but not on the high seas due to lack of legislation and legal framework. Secondly, law enforcement agencies simply lack the resources, trained personnel, and experience in dealing with such crimes in the maritime environment. Thirdly, but no less important, there is a considerable lack of information and intelligence on the activities of terrorists and arms traffickers in the maritime environment.
4.3 Enhancing Regional and International Cooperation
The evolving challenge of maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking in the Middle East requires a corresponding evolution in cooperative arrangements between states to prosecute and suppress these offenses. Since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea extends jurisdiction to states parties over these offenses on the high seas and inside exclusive economic zones, there has been incremental progress in developing cooperative arrangements to investigate and prosecute them. There is no comprehensive or integrated system of cooperative arrangements to prosecute and suppress maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking. Terrorist incidents in the last two years have been the catalyst for increased regional and international cooperation to suppress terrorism in the Middle East. These incidents have exposed limitations in the reach and capabilities of certain states and a lack of coordination between states to share information and provide mutual assistance for prosecutions. Some states have sought to conclude bilateral agreements to facilitate cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking. While this is a positive step, it does risk overlap with broader counter-terrorism agreements and reduce the focus on prosecuting these offenses. At the regional level, the MENA Asia and Indian Ocean Regions have a number of security and dialogue forums, yet there are no specific agreements or arrangements to address maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking. Phase two of the EU funded CRIMARIO project has produced an improved regional Maritime Situational Awareness tool for the Indian Ocean, yet regional legal frameworks specifically to prosecute maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking are undeveloped. Intelligence sharing is a vital part of cooperation to suppress these offenses. This will be detailed further in section 4.4 on the role of technology and intelligence sharing.
4.4 Role of Technology and Intelligence Sharing
Enhancing Omani legal frameworks for prosecuting maritime terrorism and illegal arms trafficking will also require measures and institutional arrangements to cope with rising technological sophistication among both non-state actors and criminal organizations. On a broad level, the government needs to impart knowledge and understanding about the implications of the use of technology in these contexts, particularly among judges, prosecutors, and police officers. This will require conducting comprehensive assessments about the nature and scale of the threat, particularly in the field of cyber-terrorism, and determining what sorts of technology training programs are needed. A robust legal framework is also needed that adequately encompasses the criminal misuse of technology.
The offences of arms trafficking and terrorism are the deliberate conduct of sending goods or funds to individuals or organizations known to be engaged in acts that are criminal in nature with an express or implied purpose. Given the global nature of these, the internet is likely to play a significant role in both investigations and in the commission of the offense itself. Thus, these cases will increasingly involve gathering electronic evidence in the form of recovered files, surveillance of suspects’ computer activities, or intercepts of internet-based communications. Traditionally, law enforcement has faced difficulties in dealing with such evidence due to a lack of awareness about how to obtain and use it, and concerns among criminal justice agencies and the judiciary about its reliability and the legalities of its collection. This may impede prosecution efforts, particularly in Omani cases where there will be a need to extradite suspects currently in foreign countries or to request mutual legal assistance.