Strategies for Combating Maritime Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) at Sea
1. Introduction
Maritime terrorism has seen a significant increase since the turn of the century. There are numerous reasons for this including the globalization of the world’s economies, new trends in terrorism, and an increased dependence on the sea for resources. Perhaps the most crucial and apparent reason is the fact that the maritime domain has a number of weaknesses which can be exploited by terrorists. The geographical vastness and typically limited resources allocated to security make it very difficult to protect any one area, leaving many potential targets vulnerable. The magnitude of the shipping industry means that a disruption to international trade can have enormous political and economic effects. Another important factor is the significance of the psychological impact that an attack can have. This was seen in the 2002 attack in which two explosive devices were detonated near the Limburg oil tanker off the coast of Yemen. Although the attack caused only minor damage to the ship and resulted in the death of one crewmember, it led to widespread speculation that Al Qaeda had opened a new front in its war against the US and its allies. This speculation was indeed the goal of the attack and led to a huge increase in insurance premiums for ships and goods in the area, a blow to an industry which was already suffering from the effects of 9/11. Finally, the prospective utilization of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is of great concern. Although there is no concrete evidence that any terrorist group has acquired WMDs, many policymakers and academics consider it a matter of when, not if, this will occur. The consequences of a WMD attack are almost too grave to imagine and as such there have been many initiatives to prevent this from occurring. These initiatives are what this essay considers to be an integral part of the overall counter-terrorism effort.
1.1 Background of Maritime Terrorism and WMDs
Maritime terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The first documented use of an explosive device to destroy a vessel was the attempt by a Shiite Muslim group (Hezbollah) to detonate a car-bomb aboard the Liberian freighter M.V. EL AMIN in 1983. In the following years, there were several attacks on oil platforms in the Gulf of Iran and the Gulf of Mexico. The attacks against the USS COLE and French-flagged oil tanker LIMBURG in 2000 and 2002 respectively, demonstrated a shift in operational focus by some terrorist groups back to the traditional target of maritime lineation. During the past three decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of terrorist incidents involving the use of explosives above and below the water line, and the mining and/or sabotage of vessels or port installations. Terrorism at sea is used by a variety of political extremist or religious fundamentalist groups for a host of purposes including, but not limited to, the destruction of vital enemy economic interests, or to send a message to the enemy that his own economic infrastructure or military forces are not immune from attack.
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1.2 Significance of Combating Maritime Terrorism
In recent years, maritime terrorism has increasingly become a matter of global security concern, especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Unlike traditional forms of terrorism, the utilization of the sea as a medium through which to carry out acts of terrorism provides an alternative platform to that which is more commonly protected against, has potential global or regional economic impact, and can be destructive against key state infrastructure. The effects of maritime terrorism can be severe. For example, an attack against an oil tanker or offshore oil platform could result in large-scale environmental damage. Acts such as these have the potential to create worldwide panic within the global economic market. At the same time, with the resource in question determining the state of tools used, they have potential military repercussions. Globalization and the high interdependence of the world’s economic markets could mean that an attack in one place has an economic effect in another. In this case, the reach of the terrorism transcends the attack itself. It is not to say that traditional acts of terrorism are less destructive, but rather that the nature in which maritime terrorism can affect states and other non-state actors is what makes it particularly significant. Thus, the vast consequences and forms of maritime terrorism make it difficult to specifically identify and combat, and effective prevention and response strategies have been slow to emerge. This only complicates the issue further, and so research into its significance and effective prevention measures is an important matter.
1.3 Purpose and Scope of the Research Essay
The purpose of this research essay is to lay out a set of maneuvering tactics which, if implemented, will greatly reduce the likelihood of a successful maritime terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). These tactics are not meant to be all inclusive nor final, but rather a starting point for the development of defensive plans and operations to thwart a maritime WMD attack. Methodically in order to meet this purpose, this essay will first delineate the necessity of proactive measures to protect against a maritime WMD attack and the implications of a successful attack. Then the essay will identify the likely course of action a maritime terrorist will take to execute an attack culminating in an assessment of the present threat. These first few sections are integral to gauging the severity of the threat and developing an understanding of the enemy, which in turn will dictate the nature of the defensive strategies developed later in the essay. Having established the nature and severity of the maritime WMD threat, the bulk of this essay will then propose specific defensive strategies in the maritime domain aimed at thwarting a WMD attack prior to its culmination. This encompasses both specific proactive measures to prevent a terrorist act as well as the disruption and denial of a WMD delivery into its intended target. This section will be subdivided into our proposed strategy to prevent WMD acquisition by a maritime terrorist and also our proposed strategy to thwart execution of a WMD attack. The essay will conclude with an assessment of the feasibility of our proposed strategies and the implications therein.
2. Understanding Maritime Terrorism
Starting looking at the phenomenon of maritime terrorism, we need to understand first what the meaning of maritime terrorism itself. There is no specific definition of maritime terrorism until now, but the International Maritime Organization (IMO) describes terrorism as a dimension to the criminal act. The dimension of terrorism means the criminal act was conducted by one specific group systematically, and its goal is to influence the government to provide a certain impact to their interest. While the U.S. Navy defines terrorism as the use of power or violence by individuals or groups to produce or prevent political results from the government, both domestically and globally, through force or threat. This kind of definition may not specifically point to maritime terrorism, but it can be concluded that terrorism has the same motivation as the criminal act, which is conducted by individuals or groups, and it becomes a starting point to define the act of terrorism itself. Terrorism acts can vary, depending on the level of the act, the movement, and the target that the terrorists want to reach. The same goes for the location where the act was conducted, resulting in a unique form of terrorism that differs from one place to another. Based on that fact, terrorism with acts conducted on ships or at sea must be categorized as maritime terrorism.
2.1 Definition and Types of Maritime Terrorism
Terrorism, in any form, is all about intimidation and coercion. For it to be successful, it creates an atmosphere of hesitation and fear, as a tool to persuade governments or societies to concede to the terrorist’s interests. Maritime terrorism is no different, employing the same strategies and goals as that of a traditional act of terrorism, only that it is situated in a maritime setting. One possible explanation for this shift in tactics from land to sea by a terrorist group is that it may be an easier way to circumvent security measures that have been placed onto transport systems following the September 11 terrorist attacks. An act of maritime terrorism can cause the price of marine insurance to rise, and since it is an attack on a global industry, developed countries will have a higher stake in the prevention of further attacks because they have an interest in protecting the free flow of commerce by sea. This may in turn put pressure on less developed, but resourceful terrorist groups, if their aim was to force concessions from developed countries. Overall, the effects of an attack, the potential worldwide impact, and the possibility of easier successful execution all make for an intricate and potentially serious problem.
2.2 Motivations and Goals of Maritime Terrorists
Christian Leuprecht is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and Economics at the Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada.
The goals and motivations of maritime terrorists and the use of weapons of mass destruction at sea.
Terrorism can be employed by a wide variety of actors and for many different reasons. However, the diversity and multitude of purposes to which terrorism can be put is often lost in excessively simple categorizations. For example, while it may be convenient to lump terrorists into those who are driven by religious fanaticism and those who are the tools of secular state sponsors, such categorizations oversimplify the complex reality of the dynamic between terrorist organizations and their sponsors. Similarly, not all terrorists wage campaigns against states for regime change, and even those who do may have other goals and motivations in certain circumstances. Consequently, it is important to understand that the employment of terrorism by any given organization is not a fixed strategy, but rather a variable and contingent one in service to the pursuit of other ends.
Leuprecht distinguishes between the narrow and broader goals of terrorist organizations. Narrow goals are those amenable to attainment via a single victory, such as the acquisition of territorial concessions. For example, the ETA’s (Basque Homeland and Freedom) goal of creating an independent Basque state can be considered narrow, because success in this would render the organization’s continued existence and pursuit of further objectives unnecessary. On the other hand, broader goals are those which require the indefinite continuation of the terrorist campaign, such as the alteration of a particular regime or political system. It is an oversimplification to say that all terrorists desire regime change, because what they are most often seeking is a change in the policies of a particular regime regarding an issue which is relevant to the terrorist organization.
Leuprecht also outlines the concept of temporal scope, which is the period of time over which a terrorist organization intends to employ terrorism in the pursuit of its objectives. This can range from intermittent campaigns to continuous low level violence. These variables of goals, narrow and broad, and temporal scope, define the strategic agenda of a terrorist organization in any given campaign. The strategic choice model used to determine the employment of terrorism by guerrilla organizations, wherein it is selected as the strategy best suited to the attainment of the organization’s ends, implies that terrorism is a rational choice on the part of the organization given its goals and the costs and benefits of alternative strategies. The implication of this is that terrorists weigh the potential efficacy of waging a campaign at any given time, and many are deterred by the possibility of failure and the consequences thereof. This is an important consideration when assessing the potential proliferation of WMD terrorism.
2.3 Case Studies: Notable Maritime Terrorist Attacks
In terms of the aims and activities of terrorists, maritime attacks have served a different purpose in comparison to other activities such as attacks on tourist destinations and hotels. Many incidents of maritime terrorism have been a small part of a bigger conflict between a state and a terrorist organization. An example of this is the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, where Palestinian militants hijacked an Italian cruise ship with the aim to use the hostages as bargaining tools to free prisoners in Israel.
In recent years, there has been an increase in incidents of maritime terrorism. Due to the topic being a relatively new area of research, no standard list or database of maritime terrorist incidents has been established. Despite this, a select number of incidents have become popular in news and research. Some of these incidents include the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the bombing of the USS Cole, and the most infamous of all maritime terrorist attacks, the 9/11 attack. Though this is a small number of incidents in relation to the research on the topic, they have played a large role in the analysis of the motives, goals, and impact of maritime terrorism. Due to the influence of these incidents, case study has been a major method in the research of maritime terrorism. Many academics have pushed for increased research in this area due to the advantages of policy recommendations that can be drawn from the analysis of specific incidents. This could lead to a reduction in terrorism if successful measures are implemented.
Section 2.3 Case Studies: Notable Maritime Terrorist Attacks
3. Strategies for Detecting and Preventing Maritime Terrorism
An important part of promoting the rule of law and maintaining good order at sea is the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. Legal disputes between states are a source of potential conflict that can escalate to violence, and there are a number of legal frameworks to pre-empt this risk. While it is unlikely that there would be armed conflict between states in the Caribbean over maritime claims, counter-terrorist operations have the potential to cause serious misunderstandings between affected states. For example, the interceptions of stateless vessels under the Proliferation Security Initiative can cause tensions and alleged actions in violation of international law. Measures to combat terrorism can also affect the environment and living resources, and there is a risk that terrorists themselves commit acts intended to create disputes between states. These issues warrant a strong commitment to dispute resolution and a respect for the rule of law in all counter-terrorism operations.
If the risks and costs associated with committing a crime increase, then the probability of criminals actually committing the offense should decrease. It is this basic logic that underpins deterrence theory and it clearly has an important role in efforts to counter terrorism. There has been a long-standing preference of the international community that the best way to lower risks and costs of criminal activity at sea is to increase state capabilities to intercept, disrupt, and capture terrorist and other criminal entities. This can happen only if there is a greater onus on affected states to take up a larger responsibility for their own security and stability and contribute to that of the wider international community.
States increasingly require precise and timely information on everything that could affect their security and ability to counter terrorist attacks. Maritime domain awareness is defined as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment. One of the most difficult aspects of maritime security in the current climate is identifying potential threats to local security and stability. Overall, if the Caribbean is going to effectively counter the threat of terrorism, it is essential that regional states and institutions improve their MDA. This is particularly the case as it concerns the potential transnational nature of future security threats in the Caribbean. MDA is a crucial tool in preventing the potential spillover of these threats from one regional state to another.
3.1 Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness
There are a number of particular actions and initiatives that nations can employ to bolster their own and collective maritime domain awareness. These vary according to national resource and capacity levels, and existing infrastructure and technology base. Given that authorities are increasingly reliant upon intelligence and information to prevent security incidents, and that effective prevention is significantly more desirable than having to deal with the consequences of a security incident at sea, enhancing maritime domain awareness is a sound and wise investment. Features of such an investment include the development of practical and meaningful information sharing arrangements between law enforcement and security agencies, and with the shipping and port industries. This includes both routine sharing of commercial and customs information, and sharing of intelligence and security-related information. States should aim to maximize the utilization of their civilian and military maritime information and intelligence resources to support safety and security decision making. This will help to avoid duplication and implementation conflicts, and over the longer term, will enable resource pooling and technology and systems integration between civilian and military bodies. In some cases, it may be desirable to establish a single, joint coastwatching agency with responsibility for all safety and security aspects.
One of the fundamentally critical assets for countering maritime terrorism is the establishment of advanced maritime domain awareness. The primary objectives are to employ and coordinate technologies, systems, operational procedures, and in some cases, organized teams, to provide an accurate understanding of maritime activities to support decision making and to react effectively to safety and security events. This provides the basis for allocating resources effectively, developing specific security measures, and responding to, or intercepting and thwarting, terrorism and related WMD proliferation activity.
3.2 Strengthening Port Security Measures
One of the most important steps in preventing and detecting maritime terrorism is to strengthen security measures at all ports. This is because due to the nature of shipping, the vast majority of attacks by terrorists are likely to centre around ports, and this location is the most likely way for a weapon of mass destruction to be brought into a country. The United States and other countries around the world rely on the Department of Homeland Security and their Container Security Initiative (CSI) to detect potential weapons and terrorists from entering their country. CSI is a program that stations United States customs officials in 58 of the world’s largest ports in 37 different countries. The goal of this program is to identify and inspect all containers that are bound for the United States before they can be loaded onto a ship. This is an important first step, but there are many problems with this program that need to be resolved. Currently, even with this program in place, only about 55% of containers are actually inspected, and many of these inspections are not much more than cursory glances since customs officials are overburdened with their duties. Also, in the case of a container being identified as high risk, the best case scenario is that the contents of the container are merely denied entry into the United States. This does nothing to prevent criminals or terrorists from simply looking for another opportunity to smuggle weapons into the country. While CSI is a good start, more needs to be done.
3.3 Coordinating International Cooperation and Information Sharing
The planned assaults on the WTC and the Pentagon were wake-up call events for the security of the homeland. We must determine what this means to our people, our interests, and how to respond. One of the ways the USA and its allies have chosen to respond to this threat is by detection and prevention measures geared to prevent further bribery of the international political players by either capturing or killing terrorists, seizing suspects’ assets, or mutual legal assistance in extraditing terrorists. One of the key ingredients in the strategies for combating maritime terrorism is to be able to have the legal framework to prosecute and convict suspected terrorists. This will prove to be an essential ingredient in the war on maritime terrorism by preventing a safe port for terrorists targeting the USA in alliance, and also act as an effective deterrent for potential terrorist groups thinking about utilizing the sea as a warfare medium to attack US and its allies. It is understood that the type of information sharing needed to make this happen will be extremely broad and complex involving many different levels of law enforcement and government. The main problem, however, is for many countries the process of sharing law enforcement intelligence and evidence useful for convicting criminals often conflicts with national sovereignty – especially in the areas of intelligence that may involve third country nationals or ethnic groups residing in the country. While international legal cooperation and extradition treaties may help skirt these issues by forcing one country to share intelligence with another, thus far it has not been very effective with regards to WMD related cases as offenses are often political and intelligence leads are not followed through due to fear of retaliation. This is an area which will require much research on new methods and perhaps experimentation in joint terrorism task forces and intelligence sharing operations.
3.4 Implementing Effective Legal Frameworks and Prosecution
In this case, and in others such as the MV/Limburg attack, suspects have also been released by the detaining nation due to pressure from the suspects’ home country, or from other powerful actors. This was the case in Israel’s release of over 100 Hezbollah fighters and leaders in 2004 and in Libya’s repatriation of the suspects in the aforementioned attack after the threat of sanctions by other Arab states. This is all indicative of a situation where the political cost of detaining suspected terrorists is exceedingly high, making it very difficult to enforce legal situations that may undermine the power of extremist groups. Simulation analysis has shown it to be more likely for a terrorist to be killed or to escape than to be captured and successfully prosecuted.
Legal frameworks and prosecution are currently very ineffective for countering maritime terrorism as there is no specific international law concerning maritime terrorism, making it necessary to place terrorists on trial for specific offences that are often not related to the act of terrorism itself. This leads to a situation where the majority of captured terrorists are simply held as prisoners of war and later released in a hostage exchange or when their detention becomes a political embarrassment. An excellent example of this was the Achille Lauro affair where the 4 Palestinians who hijacked the ship were apprehended by US military personnel in international waters, yet due to lack of a clear legal situation they were only tried for the murder of the disabled American citizen who was on board.
4. Countering the Use of WMDs at Sea
The potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in maritime terrorism represents a strategically significant threat for several reasons. Firstly, the possibility of killing large numbers of people and destroying symbolic targets could have disproportionate psychological effects. Secondly, the fear and economic dislocation caused by the threat or use of WMDs can amplify the impact of an attack or even a false alarm. Thirdly, the danger of proliferation of WMDs to or from state-sponsored terrorist groups increases if it is seen as a viable method for terrorists to employ. To manage this threat, there are several strategies available. One possible deterrent is to convince terrorists that the costs of employing WMDs would outweigh any potential benefits. This would involve demonstrating the capabilities to locate, secure, and render impotent any WMDs in transit. However, this could be a risky strategy as it may provoke terrorists to use WMDs as a preemptive measure. An alternative measure would be to completely deny access to WMDs and related materials into a country; however, this is incredibly difficult in the context of globalization and the enormous quantity of materials and containers moving through global transport systems. Finally, it would be a positive measure to develop a systematic understanding of why and how terrorist groups seek to acquire and use WMDs. This would ultimately enable a better development of counter-terrorism strategies and better management of conditions that give rise to terrorism.
4.1 Risks and Implications of WMDs in Maritime Terrorism
WMD have potentially devastating effects if used to attack shipping. An attack against a vessel, port or offshore industry with a nuclear weapon or a radiological dispersal device (RDD) could cause widespread death and illness, and render the area unusable for an extended period. The economic effects of such an attack could be enormous. Similarly, a chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW) attack against a vessel has the potential to cause mass casualties, and the nature of shipping may complicate identification of the cause and source of the attack. Due to the dual-use nature of many BW agents, there is also the risk that a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak in humans or livestock, in an area close to a known terrorist activity, could be mistakenly attributed to a deliberate act.
For a terrorist group, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) offer several key attractions. They provide a means to conduct attacks that have a high impact, possibly causing mass casualties. If used to attack critical infrastructure, they offer the potential to cause major disruption to industry and government. Furthermore, the fear generated by the possibility of WMD use can have significant psychological effects, both on the general public and on targeted governments. Terrorists may seek to exploit the fear of an attack, and the actual effects of an attack, to create divisions within the government or society they are targeting. If the international community perceives that a government is unable to protect its citizens from WMD terrorism, there is a risk that they may take unilateral action, possibly exacerbating regional tensions or leading to the proliferation of dangerous weapons technologies.
4.2 Maritime Interdiction Operations and Boarding Procedures
An MIO is an operation to stop, board or divert a vessel on the high seas suspected of breaching a UNSC resolution. MIOs are important, as they apply direct pressure on proliferator states as they seek to transport WMD, their components or related materials to state and non-state actor end-users. This may compel some proliferator states to change their cost benefit analysis concerning the pursuit of WMD and heighten the risk to their national security. During MIOs, compliant state and non-state actors can be easily distinguished from the proliferator entities. MIO mandates under CSAs authorize stopping, searching, sealing and diverting operations, but do not authorize the use of force. This may match the preferences of many state actors and increase the chances of their compliance. MIOs may also create a deterrent effect and dissuade potential proliferators from seeking to transport WMD components in the future. However, non-compliant proliferator entities may pose strong resistance to MIOs in an attempt to protect their perceived interests. This could lead to an escalated risk of conflict at sea with a low likelihood of conventional and nuclear use. An increased US readiness to resort to military methods of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) interdiction has added to the global reluctance to pillory the United States about its own formidable WMD capabilities.
4.3 Developing Advanced Detection Technologies
The technology, sample collection, and sample identification can provide an efficient method for identifying weapons and the surrounding environment. Sampling methods that collect air and water samples are best suitable for the tactical naval environment. Two methods used by the naval forces are the Continuous Sampling and Filtration Concentration and the other is the Solid Phase Micro Extraction. Air samples can be collected in situ from the environment. The most effective method for air sampling is to continuously pump air through a filter, which is then analyzed off-site. This ensures that the sampling location is not lost. If the location of suspected weapons of WMD deployment is known, the air can be sampled in that location and then the filters changed several times. This will provide accurate results if it can be assumed that the WMD was deployed after the last filter change. Filters can be analyzed with many different methods, e.g. SEM, TEM analysis, and mass spectroscopy. Water sampling can be conducted using similar methods, but it is possible that the sample may become diluted as it disperses through the water. If the location of the dispersion is known, it may be easier to sample closer to the source. Development of water sensors may be a more suitable alternative for detection in water samples as this will provide immediate results and can be conducted on-site.
4.4 Enhancing Response and Crisis Management Capabilities
Unfortunately, the probabilities and risks of maritime WMD terrorism are difficult to assess due to its global and clandestine nature. Terrorism attacks are able to peter principle some nuclear weapons. It is most likely that the weapons would be moved to highly populated areas, and then the terrorists would attempt to use them at the greatest effect. For terrorists possessing biological or chemical weapons, the likelihood of use is higher, but it is still difficult to decide where and how to prepare defenses. Despite these difficulties, the sheer magnitude of a WMD attack dictates that no matter how small the probability, the potential consequences are great enough to warrant extensive preparations.
As with any crisis management situation, decision-making is the key, and having set courses of action and pre-planned objectives based on a clear understanding of the situation at any given time increases the likelihood of success. So it stands to reason that the first and most vital step in preparing for the possibility of a WMD incident is risk assessment and scenario planning.
In the long term, the prospect of WMDs at sea means that nations must possess the capabilities to manage a WMD attack or the discovery of a WMD cache. Specifically, they must be able to protect key high-value targets, rapidly assess an incident and then make sound decisions based on that assessment. They also need interdiction forces able to intercept a WMD delivery and disable/destroy the WMD, a capability to conduct evacuation and denial operations and maintain some degree of normalcy in the midst of crisis, and a rehabilitation capability to restore a nation or region after a WMD attack (Davis, 2008). All of these needs are compounded by the uncertainty of an attack and the fact that states known to possess or sponsor WMD terrorism are less likely to be deterred by the threat of a punitive force against them.
Enhancing crisis response and management capabilities
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