The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party and its Model of Governance

Posted: March 13th, 2024

The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party and its Model of Governance

1. Historical Background

In the 19th century, the ruling Qing dynasty was experiencing significant internal and external pressures. The collapse of the dynastic system in China had a profound impact on the formation and development of the CCP. The success of the 1911 Revolution ended more than 2,000 years of imperial rule and established the Republic of China, but the new republic was dominated by powerful warlords and military cliques. Meanwhile, in 1917, the Russian October Revolution resulted in the Communist Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, taking power in Russia and the establishment of the world’s first socialist state. The success of the Russian Revolution had a major impact on the political landscape in China and in 1921, the Communist Party of China was founded. Inspired by the Bolsheviks, many early CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, aligned themselves with Marxist thinking and believed in the importance of “directing the gun barrel” – that is, the necessity of armed struggle, rather than just socialist intellectualism, in bringing about true social, political and economic change. However, the CCP’s early activities were hampered by repressive measures taken by the ruling National People’s Party. It is important to note that in the early 1920s, the CCP had fewer than 100 members. On the contrary, by 1925, the Nationalist Party (led by Chiang Kai-Shek) had over 50,000 and was working to eradicate the CCP. This period of cooperation and alignment with the KMT gave the CCP a safe base in which to develop. The temporary 1927 alliance led to the First United Front, when the KMT and CCP collaborated to defeat the warlords who controlled much of China. However, this alliance was short-lived and disintegrated in 1927 due to the Shanghai Massacre, when Chiang Kai-Shek purged thousands of CCP members and initiated a violent campaign of repression. The CCP faced severe oppression after the failure of the First United Front and was almost annihilated. At this critical stage, it was Mao’s peasant work and his ability to unify and channel the frustration and anger of the peasants that saved the CCP from total destruction. This set the stage for the development and eventual rise to power of the CCP.

1.1. Early Influences

Upon examination, this chapter appears to cover a broad range of topics including the influence of Western imperialism and the Opium Wars on China, the failure of the Qing Dynasty, and the impact of the rise and fall of the first Chinese Republic. Many of these points are relevant to the history of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, as outlined in the latter chapters of the book. The chapter deals mainly with the years 1911 to 1956. This is because 1911 was the year of the first Chinese Republic and this was also the year of the final abdication of Henry Puyi, the last Emperor. It is well known that the leading figures and theorists of the Chinese Communist Party, including Mao Zedong, drew from the writings and teachings of men like Marx, Engels and Lenin. The chapter also begins to explore how the turmoil of the time helped to shape the political landscape in China and allowed for the formation of the CCP. The text is quite dense, with minimal use of case studies or personal accounts. Instead, it puts forward a more factual analysis of the political scenario and how this allowed for the early development of Chinese communism. Iconography is a means of conveying a specific narrative or message to an audience and as a result, can be a useful tool in historical analysis. While the far-reaching and powerful impact of the CCP on Chinese history and society is without doubt, this chapter helps the reader understand that the Party was hardly a novice to the political landscape when it was formed in 1921. Through both an analysis of how CCP ideology is based on the ability to adjust to different scenarios and also the utilization of visual sources, this chapter serves as an insightful and intriguing introduction to the Party’s rise to power.

1.2. Formation of the Chinese Communist Party

The combination of a weak government and frequent foreign aggression led to increasing awareness and radicalization of the Chinese people. As a result, a series of political movements and parties were formed to advocate for a large range of ideologies, from complete anarchism to a fully centralized and modernized China. It was in this environment of radicalization and dissatisfaction that the Chinese Communist Party was born.

Local warlords, with their private armies known as “tun-tian,” held substantial administrative and military power over large areas of China. The government was rendered weak and ineffective due to the constant power struggles between rival warlords and the nationalist party Kuomintang. On top of that, imperialism and the unequal treaties with foreign powers had left the Chinese people greatly dissatisfied and demanded the politicians to stand up to Western and Japanese aggression.

China in the early 20th century was a country in political and social turmoil. The Qing dynasty, which ruled over China for over 250 years, finally collapsed in 1911 due to years of corruption, foreign invasions, and a failure to modernize the country. This led to the establishment of the Republic of China and the beginning of a new era, known as the Warlord Period.

Formation of the Chinese Communist Party

1.3. Rise to Power

Following the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928, the Kuomintang sought to control the newly unified Republic of China with an anti-Communist campaign, suppressing Communists and unionists in cities across the country. As a result, the Communists began to organize for a military defence of their last northern stronghold in Jiangxi. The subsequent conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists marked the beginning of a destructive and costly civil war that would continue, on and off, until the CCP successfully established the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Fearing defeat and annihilation through encirclement, Chinese Communist leaders decided to break through Nationalist lines and find a new base in the northwest of the country. Ergo, in 1934 the main Chinese Soviet base, along with over eighty thousand soldiers and Communists including the three main leaders of the party, was evacuated during a difficult and dangerous military journey known as the Long March. This strategic retreat allowed the Red Army to create new bases and further spread the Communist movement across the country. By the end of the Long March, hundreds of thousands of Chinese had been mobilized in support of the Chinese Communist Party. Also, more peasants and soldiers saw them as the powerful opposition force to the Nationalist regime. This major achievement laid the foundation for the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949.

2. Ideology and Principles

2.1. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism

2.2. Class Struggle and Proletariat Dictatorship

2.3. Mass Line and Democratic Centralism

2.4. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

3. Governance Structure and Policies

By way of concrete and simple-to-apply guidelines, the authors illustrate the profoundly undemocratic nature of the CPC’s governance structure and the total absence of political participation from below. The section details how, contrary to various typecasts disseminated in Western media and the dominant hegemony of totalitarianism, the tyrannical regime which the CPC oversees as the ruling party is recognized as a dictatorship within China itself, and a dictatorship that has strategic agendas and plans for the management and continuation of its dictatorship. The governance structure, so we learn, is such that the hierarchical ascendency of the CPC members to the very upper echelons of political power necessitates absolute allegiance to the Fuhrerprinzip within the Party and, by consequence, the total absence of legislative independence from the various political apparatus under CPC control. More precisely, Party organization and leadership, we can see, is founded upon three principal organs, and it is in the higher institutions of a Politburo and a Secretariat that the realpolitik of centralized authority and autonomous rule actualizes itself in the form of the notorious General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. This theory could be used to draw comparisons with contemporary-modelled political parties, and so the writers crucially show how this system is one that seeks not just to maintain CPC dominance through systemic and structural prevention of sovereignty between non-party actors but also to actively cultivate the perpetuation of the Party’s authority beyond the limits of any one fixed epoch. In gaining prominence in this theoretical juncture, the emphasis of the section then shifts towards interpretative and hypothetical models for governance.

3.1. Party Organization and Leadership

Indeed, it is the consistent feature of the party’s organizational and power management structures that senior figures are not elected, nor need to concern themselves with re-election, based on their performance in office. Rather, leaders exercise broad authority over the formulation and implementation of policies and decisions without reference to popular or expert opinion; decisions are made quickly and enacted throughout the state without the need for protracted consultative or legislative processes.

Throughout the national and sub-national levels of the party, the strict requirements of discipline and loyalty to the party leadership ensure a highly regimented and centralized system of governance and policy implementation. Such a system allows for the coordinated and effective development and execution of long-term policy visions by the supreme leadership, unfettered by the vagaries of popular or stakeholder concern.

The party’s discipline inspection commission has a broad remit to investigate and police the behavior of party members at all levels. This includes the power to open investigations into individual members, carry out special inspections into specific areas of public policy or activity, and to propose supplementary regulations for internal party management to the central committee. The commission has been granted extensive punitive powers as part of the party’s cornerstone anti-corruption drive. This includes the ability to remove and transfer members from their positions, recommend criminal charges against people who have retired or left the party, and propose changes to personnel regulations.

Sub-national levels of the party are led by corresponding congresses and committees at the province, city, county and village levels. Party organizations are present in all government bodies, and party leadership and government are closely intertwined—the vast majority of senior ministers also hold high-ranking positions within the party, and the general secretary of the central committee is almost always also the president of China and the commander of the military.

The national congress elects the central committee, which in turn elects and appoints the party’s highest leadership—members and alternate members of the politburo and its standing committee, the general secretary and the discipline inspection commission. The central committee also has the authority to appoint other leading party bodies, such as the general and political affairs secretariats.

The Chinese Communist Party’s organizational and leadership structure begins at the national congress level. A national congress is convened every fifth year, consisting of 2,000 to 3,000 delegates from throughout the country, including representatives from the People’s Liberation Army. This body has the power to amend the party’s constitution, elect members of the central committee and its politburo, and determine the party’s policy direction. It also has the ultimate authority over party and state affairs, although in practice this authority is delegated to the central committee during the five-year periods between congress meetings.

3.2. Centralized Decision-Making

One key foundational aspect of the CCP’s governance is its strong focus on centralized decision-making. This is, in many ways, an extension of the party’s broader ideology and principles, as well as its historical experiences of war and national development. In particular, key ideology such as democratic centralism and the Maoist emphasis on “strong, centralized leadership” have had a profound influence on the party’s approach to directing and coordinating the implementation of policies and objectives. Democratic centralism refers to the idea that policy decisions are made through an “unbroken chain of decision making that legitimately leads from the lowest level to the highest” and that all members of the party “owe loyalty to the decisions.” This reflects a wider element of CCP ideology, in which the party portrays itself as a highly organized, efficient, and unified force, in contrast to the idea or image of democratic political pluralism in the West. At the same time, the requirement for “strong, centralized leadership” might justify or legitimize the party’s more authoritative and interventionist governance styles, such as rapid policy changes or the mobilization of public resources and society, as seen in the anti-corruption campaigns of recent years. By having a small group of leaders making high-level decisions, the party is well suited to manage an efficient government administration, pushing forward more policies and projects in a shorter period of time. Furthermore, significant emphasis is placed on national-level institutions and leadership, such as the National Congress, the State Council, and the standing committee of the Politburo. These institutions represent different aspects of government functions; the National Congress, made up of appointed party representatives from across the country, is the most powerful authority among them. Such focus points are usually more influential and vital when it comes to formulating long-term policies and plans, conveying the importance of national-level coordination and decision making; this corresponds to the fact that local government leaders have much shorter terms in office and are subject to greater variety and volatility in public opinions. By explaining the meaning and superiority of national-level leadership, it is suggested that the majority of the party’s highly structured and layered institutions exist in order to facilitate effective and coherent top-down policy implementations. All this information creates a profound analysis of different elements of centralized decision making in China and how they function or relate to each other. The main argument has been illustrated clearly and the writing is logically structured. Furthermore, the explanations are very useful and insightful into translating complicated political context or Chinese vocabularies. The significance and implied influences of the central policies on the party’s organizational structures are addressed, yet related limitations are not overlooked. The majority of the paragraphs are coherent and well linked; where there is room for improvement, more in-depth discussion of the effects and drawbacks of different forms of centralized decision making is suggested in order to provide a more balanced view. Overall, this is a very informative and well-argued piece of writing about CCP’s centralized decision making.

3.3. Economic Reforms and Development Strategies

The Chinese government implemented drastic economic reforms in the 1980s. The reforms shifted the focus away from the heavy industries that were, at that time, managed by the central authorities. Instead, the newly launched “Open Door Policy” encouraged foreign investment and collaboration with foreign companies with technology know-how. Under the guidance of the “Open Door Policy,” numerous Special Economic Zones and Coastal Development Regions were established in southern China to attract foreign investment and kick off the economic reforms. The “Open Door Policy” was also launched to foreign countries. Deng Xiaoping visited the United States and had a breakfast meeting with President Jimmy Carter in January 1979, just before President Carter formally announced the United States’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China in place of Taiwan. As a result of the meeting, the Chinese government and many Western countries reached trade agreements. By introducing the “Open Door Policy” and initiating other policies such as the abolishment of the inefficient agricultural system “People’s Commune” and the launching of the “Household Responsibility System,” which transfers the management power of agricultural production from the government to the families, personal household farming and production became the priority of the agricultural sector and the rural areas.

3.4. Social Welfare and Public Services

Under the socialist system, social welfare and public services in the People’s Republic of China are designed to serve the broad masses of the people, according to the Chinese government’s official web portal. Thanks to China’s dramatic economic growth in the last several decades, the country has made significant strides in improving living standards and access to social goods. However, the Chinese leadership has also emphasized the need to create a ‘well-off society’ where all people have access to the benefits of modernization, reported Xinhua Net, a website sponsored by the Chinese government. To balance economic development and social stability, the party has implemented austerity measures and launched anti-corruption campaigns to rationalize and downsize personnel in the public sector. This is considered an important aspect of the strategy to achieve substantive welfare goals, noted Cai and Chan in the book “China in the Era of Socialism”. They argue that such campaigns “could help direct social resources to areas more urgently needed such as pension and medical care”. In recent years, the central government has gradually increased investment in social welfare. For example, the 2008 National Human Rights Action Plan described social security as a “cornerstone” of human rights protection in China and set forth specific measures to improve the system, according to China’s official submission to the United Nations. In remote and underdeveloped regions of the country, the implementation of these goals is enabled by measures such as “pairing assistance” (dual assistance), a practice of forming partnerships between developed provinces and poverty-stricken counties to facilitate targeted aid. It is important to note that today, various social welfare and public services are provided at different levels of government, including state, province, municipality, county, and community, each with different eligibility requirements and tax financing. For example, social programs such as pension and disability, among others, are often administered at the local level where the funding comes mainly from local fiscal revenues and profits from local state-owned enterprises. Rümke and Kuhlmann, researchers at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, argued for a comparative study that China’s system represents a “paradigm shift” from a country characterized by a high degree of social control and reliance on interpersonal relationships to a modern welfare state with market-oriented principles, such as efficiency and cost-effectiveness. They also observe that the party-state has systematically tried to weaken traditional kinship-based “survival strategies” by, for example, aiming to fully monetize public goods and services and to establish a modern civil society.

3.5. Control and Suppression of Dissent

One of the key features of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule is the extensive mechanism in place to control and suppress any forms of dissent against the authorities. In fact, the guarantee of the party’s unchallenged governing position was written into the Constitution in 2012. Article 5, which was affected by the 11th National People’s Congress and came into force on March 15, 2018, stipulates in its revision that “the Communist Party of China leadership is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and is a basic rule of the Constitution.” The article further stipulates that no organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of supporting or engaging in any activities that lead to the elimination of the “socialist system.” This provision highlights the purpose of the extensive infrastructure which is in place to maintain the authority of the party includes the use of the law itself as a tool to solidify the power of the party, as well as to criminalize those who are seen as threats to the party’s rule. The legislative branch, as in many other jurisdictions, is the primary source of law-making in China, with the National People’s Congress being the top of the hierarchical structure. However, the independence of legislators is limited in practice, since many members would also be members of the Communist Party, and thus the role of the party is vital in setting the strategic direction of the state and in making important decisions. Many legislators have performed the function of ‘rubber-stamping’ the proposals made by the party. Therefore, it is less important to consider the extent to which the law reflects the will of the collective philosophical and ethical reasoning of the state, in the idea of legislatures as representative of the public will, in the Chinese context. By contrast, the emphasis of the Chinese legal tradition on maintaining stability and consensus is much more compatible with what Immanuel Kant has described as “rule-based system,” which focuses on the necessity of a system of ordered processes that govern behavior rather than the emphasis of individual liberty.

4. International Influence and Challenges

The international influence and challenges section explores the CCP’s efforts to spread communist ideology abroad, including through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. It also examines the party’s trade and diplomatic relations, and the geopolitical competition and human rights concerns it faces on the international stage. Since late 1978, the CCP has pursued an aggressive agenda to portray China as a model of rapid economic development and state building, especially for the aspiring postcolonial countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, all the way to the Caribbean in the modern world. Extending the Chinese version of socialism beyond the country’s border was seen as important in the early 2000s, after the USSR was dissolved. The Chinese version of socialism has two versions of type: one that is governmental that both the USSR and the modern Russia adopted, which, according to Beijing, has been distorted, and the genuine Chinese version of socialism, which focuses on communism based on a market economy. “I believe China’s governance experience is also a part of the planning of the world’s human rights and also the progress of the world, and China’s rises will be seen as the rise of the global human rights,” Mr. Tung Chee-Hwa, who has been a pivotal public relation figure between China and the world. He further argued that China is doing the world a favor in terms of introducing its governance philosophy because “developing countries will have trust and reliance on having a nation that has the same language, the same culture but also has risen from poverty to become a modern developed nation.” It is worth to look at the so-called “The Nine-Dash Line” on the South China Sea, where most of the world’s trade routes are passing through. The communist China has claimed that almost all of the resource and territories within the line of the sea, which has conflict with the claim of territories and resources of many neighboring countries such as the Philippines and Brunei. The situation has drawn international media attraction due to the fact that it is not just a presentation of a modern Chinese foreign policy and also a potential military threat to the M L appeasing to the basic human rights such as opportunities to have fair trial. However, those countries that challenge China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea have been either disregarded or punished many international protocols because, for instance, China in 2013 publicized that its relevant enactments in the sea was regarded as a precondition to court acceptance “if the arbitration only have been initiated by the other party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” under article 281. These rhetoric, in Chinese and many international law experts’ opinion, suggested that China tried to control the court procedure of the W3DecL in case Philippines accepted successive arbitration but it did not show any interest to adhere to any court decision. This explained why many disputed countries prefer to negotiate with China bilaterally or through informal convention in order to obtain some form of benefits, so called “appeasing to the basic human rights such as opportunities to have fair trial. However, those countries that challenge China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea have been either disregarded or punished many international protocols because, for instance, China in 2013 publicized that its relevant enactments in the sea was regarded as a precondition to court acceptance “if the arbitration only have been initiated by the other party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” under article 281.

4.1. Spreading Communist Ideology Abroad

By engaging in the promotion of communism at an international level, the CCP possesses the capacity to unite Marxist movements globally and to establish a multipolar political order. This seems to be a manifestation of the vision of Xi Jinping as, by spreading Marxism, the CCP endeavors to establish a common, global objective that will be ultimately aligned with the Chinese goal of constructing a socialism that is typical of the country’s conditions. Although the CCP argues that this objective focuses on “bringing the brightest future to mankind”, it is believed that underlying this communism-oriented globalization is China’s aspiration to rule and shape the world according to its political landscapes.

In the West, the CCP has made vigorous attempts to establish its narrative through cultural avenues like the Confucius Institutes. Established in 2004, the Confucius Institutes provide Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services to people who are interested in China all over the world. The CCP’s management of Confucius Institutes and other Chinese cultural organizations can be described as “ideological execution”. All teachers employed at Confucius Institutes must have “political reliability”, and then the party will give a permit for them to work in the organization. Also, the curriculum and teaching materials are strictly checked. Any issues such as “the wrong political tendency” in teaching materials should be reported. This level of control demonstrates that the CCP is trying to narrow the discussion and control the narrative surrounding China.

The efforts of the CCP to spread communism abroad reflect the party’s ambition to establish a multipolar world and promote an alternative to Western liberal democracy. The CCP operates numerous organizations to spread the ideology of communism. The Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD), for example, is a global organization which was founded in 1949. The organization is one of the entities that the CCP uses to advance China’s political narratives. The association seeks to promote peace and development throughout the world, and it has around 1,000 members from about 200 organizations in more than 100 countries and regions.

4.2. Belt and Road Initiative

“Drawing from a decades-long history of international relations and economic strategies, the People’s Republic of China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has developed and is implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unveiled in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the BRI consists of two main components: the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. According to Tang (2015), the BRI aspires to promote the connectivity and cooperation between China and the rest of the Eurasian continent, as well as the South East Asia region. This is to be achieved by facilitating extensive and in-depth cultural exchanges, serving the full range of interests of relevant parties, and promoting joint development, economic and trade, and shared benefits in the BRI countries. The construction and development of BRI projects in the past few years signify the importance of effective governance in overseeing and administering the cross-border activities contained in this initiative. As Calvin and Du (2018) write, the BRI involves projects across many different regions and countries, covering a wide range of economic and societal sectors. They suggest that the execution of the BRI depends on high-level design and step-by-step execution which in turn relies on an effective national governance system. This term is not confined to the Government of the People’s Republic of China; rather, it refers to any organization that provides social and/or economic solutions to the public. Additionally, it denotes China’s centralizing coordinating capacity and its ability to produce and implement long-term subject strategies that connect global, regional, and national territorial levels. In early academic studies, alternative viewpoints have been suggested on the rationale behind the proposal of the BRI. Wang (2016) posits that the BRI is a strategic instrument designed by China to elevate the country to a global powerhouse, as it seeks to solve some major problems faced by China such as overcapacity and the unbalanced regional development between inland and coastal areas. The author also implies that the initiative commands both domestic and international purpose, for it “seeks to align with the national strategy of China in achieving global recognition and respect” by offering support and benefits to countries along the Belt and Road.”

4.3. Trade and Diplomatic Relations

In the meantime, the year 2020 has seen China’s proposed deals with European countries in various sectors, most notably the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. This ambitious pact, once ratified by all member states in the EU and approved by the European Parliament, aims to provide a more secure and predictable legal environment for European investors in China. It will also grant a level playing field for EU companies in the Chinese market. It is also clear that the treaty will maintain the momentum behind the deepening of economic cooperation between the EU and China, as well as turning China into a huge opportunity for the EU.

However, China’s rise and its diplomatic strategies have also brought new opportunities for Sino-European cooperation. It is widely believed that the European Union will benefit from more investment from China, since it is the second-largest economy in the world and the largest trading nation. Additionally, developing economic ties with China can generate growth and jobs in Europe. As a result, China has overtaken the United States as the EU’s largest trading partner in terms of goods, and the trade volume between China and the EU set a record high in 2020, reaching 586 billion euros. With increasing diplomatic and economic ties, China-EU relations are now referred to as a “comprehensive strategic partnership” by both sides.

Diplomatically, most countries, including the United States and its European partners, have broadly engaged China through active diplomatic relations in order to pursue their interests, such as strategic economic profit or idealistic regional stability. The Chinese Communist Party has recognized the importance of good diplomatic relations in maintaining stable trades and therefore has launched the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to expand and deepen international trade networks. So far, China’s global power and influence have become a significant concern for many Western countries. Issues such as whether China will follow certain liberal international norms, how it will be shaped by existing political and economic institutions, and what kind of leading role China will play in global governance have been widely discussed.

Before Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and opening up policy, China was relatively isolated from world trade and diplomacy. However, since the late 1970s, China has rapidly expanded its trade relations with many countries, and its trade values and share in the global market have grown dramatically. Notably, China’s manufacturing industry has become a vital part of global production chains, and the country is now the world’s largest trader in terms of total value. The structure of China’s trade has also shifted towards more advanced industrial exports, such as telecommunications and high-tech machinery, allowing China to meet the high demand from developed countries and therefore consistently achieve a large trade surplus. In terms of raw materials and fuels, China often relies on imports to satisfy its domestic production, and these commodities mainly come from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

4.4. Geopolitical Competition and Human Rights Concerns

The aforementioned international influence and challenges faced by the Chinese Communist Party are discussed in this essay. The essay focuses on several key themes to provide an overall analysis of the “The rise of the Chinese Communist Party and its Model of governance” and that specific section. First and foremost, this essay takes a strategic approach. The essay speaks to the broader themes of Chinese history, such as economic inequality, social unrest, and imperialism. The focus on geopolitical competition and then on the Belt and Road Initiative situates the party’s international efforts within the context of the nation’s historical relationship with colonization and political oppression. The overall impression that the essay tries to give is that the international influence and challenges faced by the Chinese Communist Party. However, the essay does not take a negative or critical perspective on that, but instead, tries to analyze what are the challenges imposed on this ruling party in order to assure the realization of the party’s goal, which is leading China toward its renaissance and the goal of national self-determination. The Guangdong- 21st century Maritime Silk Road is a mere special project as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In essence, it is a series of projects designed to promote closer economic and trade relationships between China and its regional and strategic partner. Data from the field of sport, which was described. Surveys and interviews were conducted. For instance, items that allow people to express their identity and belief were displayed and public opinion regarding whether the government has the rights to decide what is best for the country. Data collected from these two different approaches can provide a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of why the party’s legitimacy is often questioned and what actions the party has taken to strengthen its authority and eliminate the contention. In conclusion, the essay should not abate any political acts taken by the party, but explaining the trend of the party’s power from the historical setting to its effort in maintaining its legitimacy, the essay made an argument, focusing on multiple keywords, about the durability of CCP’s one-party rule in the future.