The Role of Anti-Piracy Technology in Improving Vessel Security in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea
1.1 Background of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea
The Gulf of Aden, which is located in the Arabian Sea between Yemen on the south coast of the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia at the tip of the Horn of Africa, has been a main shipping route between Europe and Asia for centuries. The gulf derives its name from the seaport of Aden in southern Yemen, which forms the better part of the north coast of the gulf. Nominal limits of the gulf are defined generally between the Isthmus of Juba, Yemen on the south, which connects with the Red Sea. The Red Sea is an inlet of the Indian Ocean and through its connection to the gulf, the Bab el Mandeb strait near the village of El Mandeb. It is roughly 1800 by 440 miles (2900 by 710 km) and is over 2250 feet (675m) deep. The Red Sea is known for its blue warm water and is characterized by a lack of tidal currents or sea swell.
The problem of piracy in this region of the world is not a new phenomenon, but the frequency and level of violence seen today has rarely been higher. According to the International Maritime Bureau, the number of reported attacks in the Gulf of Aden has vastly increased in the past 3 years, from 13 in 2004, to 42 in 2007, and rising to 111 in 2011. A lot that goes on in this region does not get reported to the IMB and the threat to shipping is very real.
1.2 Significance of Vessel Security
Security is an important function that every country strives to raise its security level. According to Minchinton et al. (2006), security is a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that enable a state to carry out its activities in a stable and safe environment. From the definition itself, we can see that security is not only to protect but it is a condition to enable a country to develop because without security, it is hard for a country to improve its state of development. The same goes for a vessel that carries a particular country’s flag. Security is essential in order to make sure the activities of the vessel can be executed in a good environment and no hindrances should occur. For years, many ship owners have made comprehensive plans to protect their crews and their vessels from hostile, well-trained, and heavily armed pirate groups. Unfortunately, recent incidents that happen in the Gulf of Aden have shown that plans such as deploying armed guards, training crew for anti-piracy, and etc have failed. This is due to the strength and capability of the modern-day pirates. According to ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) website, the attack in the Gulf of Aden against a vessel is a serious threat to life and physical integrity with serious psychological, social, and economic consequences. This has created an awareness on an international level to address the issue where the United Nations have taken a step to create United Nations Security Council resolutions to suppress piracy.
Coastal defense is the main anti-piracy activity that aims to give protective and preventive measures to ensure the security level is achieved. According to the Ministry of Defense Malaysia, defense operations are conducted to control the seaways and provide a protective location which in this case is the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. This is supported by operation planning known as Operation RELEX with a main focus on EU NAVFOR Somalia or known as European Union Naval Force Somalia who conduct naval operation to protect the World Food Program and AMISOM. This aims to protect vessels of UN’s WFP (World Food Program) livelihood and carrying food for displaced persons and the most vulnerable populations in Somalia. Based on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) website, Maritime Security is the state of law and order on the seas and the absence of events that threaten law and order. This is what all ship owners want to achieve to make sure their vessel activities can be conducted safely. With the amount of effort been taken, ship owners have been advised to register their vessel under countries that are involved in coastal defense activities. This is to ensure that it will be easy for naval forces or coast guards to provide security assistance to the registered vessel.
Looking towards the concept of vessel security, it is the duty for ship owners to ensure that their crews and vessel will be protected. The decision of vessel registry with countries involved in coastal defense is said to be a very good decision by ship owners. But the problem is only there is too much ambiguous motive on deciding what cause to be taken in ensuring security by using the easiest and lowest cost way. In the end, vessel registry is only a part of the ship owners/businessman plan to reduce high insurance cost due to piracy activity and this will lead to some of them using the easy way such as changing registry to flag of convenience countries. Price and Pinkerton (2003) have stated that Flag of convenience is an insult to the very principle of maritime safety and security. In the end, it is hard to ensure the security level because the vessel might end up deploying veiled knights of fortune to private military companies and this is a very high risk to be taken due to the complexity of international law nowadays in view of written and customary laws compared with previous international law which is mere consent of State practice on any issue.
1.3 Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, in order to determine the effectiveness of anti-piracy technology in countering it. By doing so, the study will identify any gaps or areas in anti-piracy technology that require improvement, through thorough understanding of the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by modern day pirates, with consideration of the history and their previous methodology. Upon determining such gaps, the study will investigate various industries to determine whether technologies exist or are in developmental phases which can be used to counter the piracy methodology identified. Any such technologies will be assessed on their potential to be developed into an anti-piracy technology which can effectively deter pirate attacks, and if found to be feasible, the study will identify the best technological solution for dealing with each individual piracy method. Finally, the study will provide recommendations for the improvement of anti-piracy technology in countering piracy specifically in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, and may also have recommendations for the development of new technologies specifically designed to counter modern day piracy.
2. Anti-Piracy Technology
This was based on the presumption that the most effective anti-piracy tactic for a small boat (Tzannatos, 2006) was to pass the burden of theft or attack on a merchant vessel back to the boat’s country of origin due to the inability to trace the boat back to the act of piracy. A second presumption was that higher level of security would be most necessary when transiting an area of known piracy and a vessel of significant value usually determined by cargo with a significant threat to life if a piracy attack were to occur.
The PRC Code and the ISPS Code both stress the importance of a security assessment as this is the identifying factor of what level and types of security are necessary on a vessel or at port facilities. According to Tzannatos (2006), the two keys of technology improvement in piracy prevention to the ship are to avoid confrontation, and delay or detection and alert. Therefore, when a security assessment was made, it was decided that the effectiveness of certain methods of technology would be determined by their merit to avoid confrontation and delay or detection and alert.
The ship security assessment conducted in the study focused heavily on anti-piracy technology as a means to improve vessel security. According to Karcich (2000), technology will always improve and change the methods used in anti-piracy. Therefore, a statement may be made that it is more important to study the concepts and systems of technology derived methods in preventing piracy, rather than the specific devices itself.
2.1 Definition and Types of Anti-Piracy Technology
The definition of anti-piracy technology
Anti-piracy technology takes many forms, the majority of which can be categorized into two distinct areas: defensive and offensive technology. Defensive technology is primarily based on the deterrence of pirates. This involves an assumption that pirates will avoid vessels if they provide an increased risk of capture or a decreased chance of a successful attack. One method is to employ private security teams to protect the vessel. Although this is not a technology itself, its presence is expected to increase with recent decisions by the UN to allow international forces to enter Somali territorial waters in order to combat piracy. The security teams are able to use various defensive technologies in conjunction with their presence, including electric anti-boarding systems such as the ‘MarineGuard’ developed by British company BCB International. This device provides a low-amp electric pulse to the handrails on a vessel, making it uncomfortable for pirates to board the ship. Other defensive technologies include the ‘Secure-Ship’ system developed by Ovation Systems. This is a video motion detection system used for early warning of potential security breaches around the ship’s perimeter. The system analyzes video images and automatically detects movement in predefined alert zones. Actions are triggered when the object is within a certain range of the ship. At a more basic level, one very simple and cost-effective defensive technology used by ships is to hang razor wire from the ship’s rails to deter climbing from the sea. Closed circuit television (CCTV) systems are also widely used in order to monitor and record potential security breaches, although this can hardly be viewed as being specific to anti-piracy security.
2.2 Advantages and Limitations of Anti-Piracy Technology
The advantages of these practices are clear. If you can prevent a ship from being pirated, then it reduces the financial impact and the cost of the ransoms being asked by the pirates. By deterring the pirates, crews will suffer less trauma, and it is not uncommon for a pirate ashore to readily execute a hijacked crew, there is less chance of loss of life. Anti-piracy technology helps to regain the moral high ground for the crews; no longer will they be using makeshift weapons to defend their ships, now they have viable protection and a safer working environment.
Crew and ship safety is the priority for any shipping company, and the development of anti-piracy technology has provided them with the best possible chance. Different anti-piracy devices on the market vary with different uses. There are barbed wire lines and water cannons to prevent the pirates boarding the ship, sonic weapons and LRADs to deter them, and in the worst-case scenario, there are safe rooms and anti-ballistic systems to protect the crew.
Throughout the work, there is proven to be no mathematical constant in calculating the probability of these two theories. There are various levels of conflict, classifying it is hard to do. Also, the institutionalism theories differ depending on the situation. With the recent upgrade of anti-piracy technology and the efforts put into place, it will have a considerable impact on both theories. The realist perspective would be to increase the security of all ships but the most important ones, as this is a tournament situation and beliefs in relative gains. Meanwhile, with the institutionalism theory, by reducing the freedom of pirates out at sea, the less chance there is of them taking their conflict ashore, giving it less of an impact at a regional level.
2.3 Recent Developments in Anti-Piracy Technology
In 2007, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) expressed its concern about the increase in acts of piracy against ships and crews. This resulted in the escalation of the piracy situation in 2008, particularly in the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Somalia. Governments worldwide became more aware and thus, purchasing insurance or indemnity would be an effective way for ship-owners, charterers, and ship operators to transfer the risk of kidnap and ransom, piracy, terrorism, and war into a deal with professional security companies. This would result in numerous Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) emerging in later years. PMSCs hired by ship owners provided a more professional take on vessel security compared to crews using makeshift defenses such as fire hoses or the ship’s flare systems. Another development was the use of razor wire as a barrier on ships’ handrails and walls, making it harder for pirates to board. Although such methods were rather successful to a certain extent, it is agreed that the best option is to stop pirates from even boarding the ships. This led to the improvement and availability of low-cost anti-piracy devices.
3. Improving Vessel Security
For the purposes of this research, security technology is defined as any method, process, or implementation that serves to deter or prevent an act of piracy or other security breach against a vessel. Anti-piracy technology as a subset of security technology mainly includes passive methods, or systems that require little or no direct action on the part of the crew. An example of this would be the implementation of a movement monitoring system designed to alert crew members of an incoming threat, or a fortified barrier designed to prevent boarding. This research is interested specifically in these types of methods, as an increase in the manpower of defensive security measures such as armed guards does not statistically decrease the rate of piracy on a global level, and may in some cases increase the risk of violent confrontation.
The concept of “improving vessel security” is a strategic decision that shipping companies face when considering their vessels’ voyages through high-risk areas. It often brings to mind images of armed guards and armored ships. However, not all methods are created equal, and an investment in vessel security may not necessarily yield effective results. One of the most powerful tools in the fight against piracy is the implementation of security technology. This science is a broad term that could encompass anything from night vision equipment to acoustic devices, to the armed guards and armored ships mentioned above.
3.1 Risk Assessment and Security Planning
The primary objective of risk assessment is to identify threats, possible loss and damage, and develop counter-measures to reduce the likelihood of these unfortunate events occurring. In cases of piracy attacks, the possible loss and damage is relatively high and can range from the loss of valuable items to the loss of seafarers’ lives from either physical harm or psychological trauma. As the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea are volatile areas with a high threat of piracy, it is crucial for shipping companies to conduct risk assessment on vessels passing through these areas. One method of assessing the risk is to identify and evaluate the vulnerabilities of the ship, its crew, and more importantly, its cargo. This can be done through risk analysis, which is a method of breaking down a process or situation into its ingredients, which are known as risk elements. By using a systematic step-by-step approach, a list of vulnerabilities can be identified and the likelihood and consequence of piracy attack on each vulnerability can be assessed.
A similar method is the Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), which is designed to identify what could go wrong with a product or process, the effects it would have, and how this can be avoided. By identifying weaknesses in security procedures and possible lapses which could lead to pirates gaining access to the ship, effective measures can then be developed to strengthen these areas and therefore prevent and reduce the risk of attack. The use of FMEA is useful in conjunction with risk analysis as it evaluates the impact of each risk element and creates a systematic approach to developing and evaluating the countermeasures in preventing piracy.
3.2 Training and Education for Crew Members
The most comprehensive approach to training would be to integrate crews’ security training with the UKMTO and MSCHOA (previously known as EU NAVFOR). By these means, the naval and military intelligence can instruct seafarers on the occurrences, locations, and specific threats which are likely to be encountered during their transits. However, it is difficult to implement and maintain for the duration of a voyage. This method is more applicable to yachts and pleasure craft whose shorter durations make linkage with military forces more feasible.
These established requirements of training and education have been interpreted as a valuable educational experience and a benefit to the operational safety of the seafaring community with regards to piracy in high-risk areas (Montgomery, 2009). In terms of methods and content, the Code gives no clear direction. It is there that a plan is needed to integrate education and training as a tool to raise security awareness and as a force in changing crewmember behavior.
The ISPS Code addresses the need for training and education as an element of vessel security and anti-piracy measures (IMO, 2002). Part B of the Code, section 9 requires that the Company shall ensure that:
9.1.1 – Shipboard personnel are trained or assigned to security duties.
9.1.2 – Company security officers are appointed.
9.1.3 – The Master, and others with responsibility for security on the ship, understand their responsibilities.
The highest technology and most comprehensive security plan is ineffective without the cooperation of crew members. During a piracy incident or a security breach, the crew of a vessel ultimately determines its fate. Crew members who are aware of the threats, tactics, and strategies of pirates and who understand their role in preventing a successful attack are better prepared to cope with and overcome a potentially dangerous situation.
3.3 Collaboration with International Maritime Organizations
When the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea demonstrated an increasing threat to international shipping, in order to put a stop to the piracy occurring in the region, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) facilitated a series of meetings held between various anti-piracy forces. These meetings initially established a basic platform for information sharing amongst the attending nations who possessed a vested interest in what was determined as a high-risk area. Moreover, they were aimed to address a number of issues concerning the legal complexities involved in placing armed security teams on board ships, including consensus regarding rules of engagement and laws pertaining to the detention of pirates. In keeping with provisions set down in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, nations were urged to cooperate with Somali authorities in a number of areas, namely prosecution, internment, and the logistical facilitation of such events, in an effort to offload the burden of detaining and trying captured pirates from the naval forces who have been responsible for the majority of pirate arrests in recent years. Recently, there have been global efforts aimed at facilitating better coordination and cooperation in the fight against piracy. Most notably, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings held monthly between the European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta and various naval forces with a presence in the Gulf of Aden have successfully bridged the gap between military and private security efforts in the HRA to provide comprehensive situational awareness and a shared platform for resolving issues of conflict between different security entities.
4. Case Studies
Through examining a successful application of an anti-piracy technology, the thesis can identify exactly how the technology improved security. The case of the LNG carrier Kourangil is an excellent example. The vessel was equipped with LRAD, armed guards, fire hoses, and razor wire lining the vessel. When Kourangil was approached by pirates and attempted an attack, the mere use of LRAD and a broadcasted message to the pirates sufficed in thwarting the potential attack. This clearly defines a success in security; the technology prevented the occurrence of a violent altercation and thus averted the dangers associated with a pirate attack. The pirates later boarded an alternative vessel assuming it was Kourangil and were subsequently arrested by the US navy, the result of the pirates mistaking Kourangil further credits the technology and not merely luck at having prevented an attack. In an interview with a PMSC security team leader, who was onboard a vessel during a successful deterrence of a pirate attack, it was understood that the availability of an anti-piracy technology and the competency of correctly using it is often a factor that influences pirates to target an alternate vessel. This has huge implications in vessel safety, as an attack prevented is always safer than an attack defended. This allows to contrast reasons why attacks commonly still occur on vessels with no anti-piracy technology; generally, it’s a lack of understanding the available technology and its costs, combined with the belief that the risk of an attack might not be high.
The case study is fundamentally a two-part module that formulates the primary structure of the thesis. It explores the role of anti-piracy technology in two-fold. Primarily through a successful application of anti-piracy technology on a specific vessel, followed by a comparative analysis of various technologies. As a whole, the case study attempts to offer a “real-world” example of how anti-piracy technology can be implemented to achieve the objective of enhancing vessel security in the Gulf of Aden.
4.1 Successful Implementation of Anti-Piracy Technology
As a result of issues with declining security to merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, agencies have taken the initiative to address this problem by conducting research to find promising anti-piracy technology. The agreements and implementation of these technological measures vary in agreement, ranging from private security companies to the European Union, whose naval forces have typically defended at-risk vessels solely through maritime patrols. Within this range of sponsors and agreements, two notable implemented agreements include vigilant security measures established by individual shipping corporations and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) developed by Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, executed by institutions of the European Union with legislative deference. In August of 2008, the European Union’s Council adopted a decision to commence Operation Atalanta, a mission to prevent and repress piracy and armed robbery off of the Somali coast. This operation has become a fine case study and the manner in which its sponsorship and implementation an abundance of security contractors and technology offers an encompassing look at anti-piracy operations till date.
4.2 Comparative Analysis of Different Anti-Piracy Technologies
Thwarting piracy involves balancing the cost of protection with possible losses. Decision makers can use cost effective resource allocation to minimize the expected cost of Seychelles piracy. While this may be inefficient in a global perspective, it can be rational from the perspective of individual owners of vessels intending to trade in the region. In an ideal world, all vulnerable vessels would be protected by an armed guard and escorted by dedicated naval forces. In reality, the number of such resources available is limited, so it is important to identify the vessels that can be most effectively protected. Fixed resources are assumed to be the number of naval escorts and their budget, and the cost per day of a guardsman is assumed to be the same as the daily wage of a typical ransom demand victim. Ransoms are typically more than the actual value of the guardsman and result in a potential future cost to the vessel owner due to increased ransom expectations. A full game theoretic model of the pirate-ship interaction would require a detailed behavioural model of the pirates and vessel owners, and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is evident that the pirates should always attack the least defended vessels given the opportunity. This may mean that a single less well protected vessel or convoy draws most of the pirate attacks so, for simplicity, we assume that pirate attacks are evenly distributed across all vulnerable vessels. Given these assumptions, different piracy protection methods can be considered in terms of their cost and the vessels that can most effectively be protected. This can be modelled as a complex optimization problem, and here we give an informative analysis based on observed data. Note that in practical terms we can consider a pirate attack as successful or unsuccessful, and our goal is to maximize the proportion of unsuccessful attacks keeping other factors constant.
