Enhancing information sharing and collaboration between regional coast guards and intelligence agencies

Posted: February 29th, 2024

Enhancing information sharing and collaboration between regional coast guards and intelligence agencies
1. Introduction
The 9/11 attack gives a very significant impact on world security, which also gives a signal to members of the security and intelligence agencies to be more prepared for any drastic incidents. The 9/11 commission report shows that there is a situation of intelligence failure across the nation, lack of collaboration in any joint community, and systemic problems. It’s a simple interpretation of the intelligence failure where they were unable to ‘see the big picture’. Failure to share information and lack of a collaborative culture throughout the national security community all contributed to the intelligence and security capabilities before 9/11, in which the effects are very damaging to the nation. As for Malaysia’s security and current prime minister, the interest shown is substantial. Malaysia has been identified as a main transit point for militant trafficking between countries. Understanding the model of the internal security since the tip-off from intelligence agencies, the scenario of general security, and also the coast guard would provide a good opportunity to design the system.
Coast guards and intelligence agencies are vested with the power and authorities to give their best in order to sustain and anticipate the security breaches and safety offenses back at their home front. But as the security intensity increases, the diversities and the complexities of the networks expand, making it harder for the security agencies to tackle the problems efficiently. The biases of each security agency are depending upon their culture and traditions sometimes limit their perspective in understanding a problem. On the other hand, coast guards are more concerned about the safety at sea and also the customs activities. They too pose a unique model of operation, especially in a time-sensitive information requirement which is usually obtained from multiple sources.
1.1 Background
The second agency, known now as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, has a long running history in providing communicated and dissemination of information is a key element to successful naval or law enforcement operations implemented by any country. The more actionable the information, the more likely it is that success will be attained. In present times there is an extraordinary amount of information available to the countless number of operations that the military or police carry out. This information is gained predominantly through technology, which is rapidly growing in better precision and variety.
There are two main agencies that will be discussed in this thesis. The first is the United States Coast Guard, while the second is the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. To better understand their roles, there needs to be a brief overview of their responsibilities and organizational structure. The USCG’s primary responsibility is to find and prevent any illegal activities intended to harm the United States public, environment, or economic interests occurring in or around the maritime domain. Due to the events of September 11th and the potential threats against United States interests, the responsibilities of the USCG have been increasing. On January 25, 2003, the USCG became a new department of Homeland Security and is now responsible for the prevention and preparedness for another terrorist act on the United States from the maritime domain. Although it is uncertain if another terrorist attack will come from the maritime domain, this new role of responsibility moves the USCG to operate more collaboratively with United States intelligent agencies. The USCG has been queried by this statement of “intelligence must drive operations”.
1.2 Problem Statement
Though the concept of information sharing and collaboration is highly ideal, the reality is that it is largely underdeveloped amongst regional coast guards and intelligence agencies. This is in part due to both conceptual and systemic problems. On a basic level, many agencies are more concerned with protecting intelligence and information as a source of prestige than seeing to parlay it into tactical advantage in a joint operation. The notion persists in some circles that collaboration with foreign entities is in itself a compromise of national integrity. On a practical level, the information systems and protocols of agencies are often incompatible, and there is a lack of mutual awareness as to the specific functions and typical information holdings of other organizations. The end result of these factors is that coast guards are often left out of the intelligence loop and do not become involved in intelligence efforts until they initiate a drug or migrant interdiction and request intelligence support from a partner agency. This situation is less than ideal, as while coast guards are not intelligence agencies, an intelligence presence can greatly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations in which they are involved. Similarly, coast guard specific information is often of direct relevance to intelligence efforts being conducted in the maritime domain, yet it is not always brought to the attention of the appropriate agencies. This information “transient,” where intelligence agencies supporting a coast guard operation are not fully aware of the nature of the operation or the information the coast guard has available, is a frequent cause of frustration for both coast guards and intelligence agencies.
1.3 Research Objectives
Identify policies, strategies, and procedures used to aid information sharing and collaboration of intelligence for transnational organized crime and how they have been developed. Ensure the compatibility and interconnectedness of coastguard and intelligence agency systems and databases to facilitate information sharing and use. Explore the regional intelligence environment in the South Pacific and identify how it can model a structure to enable information sharing and collaboration with all agencies involved in maritime security in the region. Identify and evaluate enabling factors and obstacles to cooperation and information sharing from the perspectives of individuals and agencies in both sectors. Develop recommendations based on research findings about improvements to information sharing and collaboration between coast guards and intelligence agencies and apply these to the South Pacific regional context.
2. Information Sharing Challenges
Many of the most important challenges facing coast guards and intelligence agencies in the sharing of information result from constraints presented by the present communication infrastructure. It is common for information systems within intelligence agencies to be incompatible. This may be between agencies at a single level of government or it may be at a national level where attempting to share information with agencies with similar responsibilities might result in sending information on the same event multiple times because governmental boundaries define the geographic responsibilities of each organization. This incompatibility is a reflection of the autonomy of the organizations and off-the-shelf systems from vendors. Systems are procured independently to satisfy the unique requirements of individual agencies. The effect is duplicated systems and information that cannot be shared. A similar problem exists with coast guards who use disparate systems and databases to store information.
Between intelligence agencies, coast guards and across national boundaries, the lack of a shared terminology and standardization of intelligence and information is a significant barrier to information sharing. Military definitions often differ from those of civilian law enforcement agencies. Even within a single agency or community of interest (COI) there may be stove-piped systems, each with its own unique definitions and coding schema. When trying to communicate a report of an event or to query information from another agency, the lack of a common language makes successful communication and comprehension of the information very difficult. This problem is only magnified when trying to share information with agencies from other countries and international organizations.
2.1 Lack of Communication Channels
Communication is passed mostly through verbal or non-verbal signs, signals, written messages, and may take place using a multitude of media, like the internet (book review paper). Communication given by one entity (the sender) must be translated by another entity (the receiver). An accepted communication is said to occur if the intended message from the sender is similar to the received message by the receiver, so giving rise to a cycle. This exchange is the essence of coordination, where two or more entities act in a way that is independent to when they otherwise would have acted, but in a way they have agreed upon. Communication and coordination are the fundament of a prudent coalition and are essential to reaching and functioning as an effective military alliance.
Communication takes place when two or more people make contact in order to share ideas, information or behavior. It is the paramount means by which people work together; in its absence, there can be no organization, and in its presence, there is almost no limit to what can be achieved.
2.2 Data Security Concerns
Security concerns are known to be the largest barriers to information sharing between agencies. An intelligence agency or coast guard may be willing to share information with an agency that it trusts, however, it will be cautious in sharing that information with all agencies that may be authorized to access it. The fear is that any information shared with a particular agency may be accessed by others to whom the information was not intended, or that the recipients will use the information in a way that is counterproductive to the sharing agency’s interests. Such concerns are warranted in the existing state of information systems, as the controls placed on the dissemination of shared information are not adequate to enforce information access rules. This often leads to over-classification of information, where sensitive information is not shared at all due to fears that it may be delivered into the wrong hands. The result is redundant information gathering efforts and intelligence failures. An example of this was seen after the September 11th attacks on the United States. It was revealed that fragments of information regarding the terrorist activities were in the possession of several different agencies, however, the ability to connect the dots was lost. This was due to a lack of information sharing and a failure of intelligence analysis.
2.3 Fragmented Information Systems
Interoperability among coastal agencies is required to ensure that all agencies can work in a cohesive way. Interoperability is defined as the ability of different information technology systems and software applications to communicate. Data that can be exchanged and used instantaneously by people who want to access it. Fragmented information systems and lack of interoperability are not only problems within and between coast guard agencies, but also grave problems when coast guards want to share information with other organizations. An example might be an agency using a proprietary system that will not allow its intelligence to be accessed by others who do not have the same. Another example might be an agency trying to export intelligence information it feels is important, in a data format that is incompatible with the system used by the intended recipient. These are all examples of fragmented information systems, which result in lack of information sharing and the inability to collaborate to solve common problems. Interoperability among coast guards and other identified organizations is a vital first step toward improving information sharing and collaboration. The capability to operate with other agencies, and to access and provide information using the same systems, will remove many of the barriers to external information sharing. This project recognizes that technology and data format issues may take time to solve, but importantly aims to change the culture and attitudes towards information sharing in the shorter term. Changing the culture and attitudes is necessary if the long-term objective of sustainable behavioral change and information sharing is to be achieved.
This project recognizes that technology and data format issues may take time to solve, but importantly aims to change the culture and attitudes towards information sharing in the shorter term. Changing the write my thesis UK culture and attitudes is necessary if the long-term objective of sustainable behavioral change and information sharing is to be achieved. An implementation phase has been proposed following the research phase, for a proof of concept trial of a regional MDA information sharing system, with participation from coast guards and other identified organizations. It is hoped that the improved information sharing and collaboration demonstrated during the trial phase will encourage longer-term behavior change and commitment to information sharing from participating organizations.
3. Collaboration Strategies
One important avenue for future collaboration is the establishment of joint task forces. Joint task forces are small multidisciplinary teams that temporarily focus on narrow issues. They are led by an explicit task, enabling intelligence agencies to bring Coast Guards into their investigations without employing them full-time. Such a structure has been used to great success between the US Coast Guard and various law enforcement agencies on issues such as drug smuggling. Intelligence agencies found information about smuggling through their intelligence networks and informed the Coast Guard to intercept the drugs. Often, Coast Guard involvement in these operations was limited to providing law enforcement with intelligence on the location of smuggling vessels and the times of their landfalls. By joining Coast Guard and intelligence personnel into an intelligence-led task force, it would be possible to solve complex issues such as maritime terrorism with Coast Guard expertise and intelligence information brought to bear on the problem. The task force could direct Coast Guard assets to law enforcement-based operations while avoiding activities that would blur the line between military and police action. At any time when task force activity is not warranting Coast Guard involvement, the lack of a full-time commitment means that intelligence agents will not be taking Coast Guard concerns into account. The mission is temporarily disbanded. Task force participation represents a flexible and low-risk method to bring intelligence and Coast Guard personnel together to work on overlapping issues.
3.1 Establishing Joint Task Forces
The joint task force is perhaps the most complex and resource-intensive of the collaboration strategies. It is a flexible team of leaders and experts from two or more organizations that is formed to work on a specific issue or issues for a limited period of time. Joint task forces may be the appropriate strategy when there is a need for high level commitment to work together on an issue, coordination of effort is essential, and there is a need for high level integration of different organizational cultures. The joint task force offers an opportunity to solve a problem at the working level to build commitment and trust between organizations. It is less complex than full scale integration and may offer a practical option for testing the waters prior to more complex strategies. However, joint task forces are not without their difficulties and failures. They may be costly both in direct and opportunity costs and may not lead to lasting change if the issue is not addressed. Joint task forces are often criticized for lack of sustainability and an end point. This can lead to problems if the issue has not been resolved and the joint task force is disbanded. At the same time, joint task forces can become institutionalized beyond their useful lifespan if they are successful in building strong working relationships and have leaders who are committed to keeping them together. Joint task forces require strong leadership and skilled management of the interorganizational relationship.
3.2 Sharing Best Practices
The UK and countries alike can share their best practices by using the methods described by Carley (1993). By using similarities in terminology, “the broader purpose is to increase the possibility that one entity will understand another’s behavior”. This can be achieved through creating relationships between the two entities to discuss specific areas of best practice. For example, a meeting between the France and UK Coast Guard specifically to discuss helicopter operations could lead to the UK detailing their recent success in the transfer of medivac paramedics to a vessel at sea and the training methods used to accomplish this. This would provide the beginning of best practice knowledge transfer. Another method described by Carley is to “define practices and procedures that can link competent behavior at the task level with the overall production of effectiveness”. An example of this would be the use of a best practice in a search and rescue mission. Effectiveness could be determined by the amount of lives saved and a percentage of how close they are to reaching this goal. By comparing the same best practice to a similar mission, the US Coast Guard could provide empirical evidence to the Italian Coast Guard that their method is the most effective.
Best practices are distilled experiential knowledge about what works best in a certain area of activity. The idea of ‘best practices’ assumes that some techniques, methods, approaches, or activities are more effective than others. These can be applied in a range of areas, from software development to the workings of a parliament. The Coast Guard Agency has a best practice when it comes to rescuing people drowning. The best method has been proven to be approaching the victim from behind and pulling them onto a board that the rescuer would swim back to shore on. Although this method has been proven to be the best practice in terms of the rescuer’s safety for both the UK and US Coast Guard, it’s still being debated in other coast guard agencies across the world. The method can be debated until a controlled study is done and concluded through the analysis of results.
3.3 Conducting Joint Training Exercises
A study by Benot Jacqueline and John L’Ern L’Ern occurred in the wake of September 11, found that French customs and British immigration officials had been conducting joint training exercises at least once a year and often twice a year in an effort to help combat illegal immigration at the UK-France border. During the past ten years, joint training exercises brought by the INCA (French Customs National Institute) and the UK Immigration Service focused on various issues related to immigration control, joint control methods on the common border, and also identified and assessed the impact of major national and EU policies on each other’s working practices. The first six joint training operations were held during the closure and reopening of the limit to the free movement of persons in context. A focus was placed on a specific theme of enforcing immigration control measures. The exercises then expanded towards a general joint control approach on the same border and also assuming the role different players involved in the control process. The training sessions were often evaluated and led to changes in procedures on both sides of the border. This is an example of how two different agencies can work towards a common goal through exercises that are aimed at specific tasks. Coastal, maritime, and port security agencies can adopt similar methods to these intelligence agencies in the realm of information sharing and control of movement of persons and goods.
The subsequent section introduces the notion of joint training between two very different agencies. The application of joint training is a strategy employed by many agencies who have to work in unison with civilian organizations or even intra-governmental organizations. Dr. Robert E. Kramer identifies two key reasons why agencies conduct joint training exercises. The first is that by being exposed to the culture, language, and learning to perform the tasks of the other agency, it increases understanding, provides insight into the other agency’s perspectives, skills, and methods, and clarifies where and how the two agencies can work together effectively. The second reason is that disasters and large-scale events are not the time for agencies to learn how the other operates. It is often said that the first time agencies meet each other is on the scene of an incident. Joint training allows the agencies to interact in a low-risk, low-stress environment. The relationships that are built and the lessons learned through joint training exercises can be the driving force behind policy changes that result in more effective operations.
3.4 Utilizing Technology Solutions
A significant obstacle to maritime security information sharing has simply been the ability to locate and retrieve information dispersed among stove-piped systems and databases. This has been exacerbated by the global distribution of information over the World Wide Web. For instance, US Coast Guard intelligence officers taking part in a counter drug operation have found that the most useful information has often come from other countries. Unfortunately, the intelligence products that were shared were often nothing more than PowerPoint slides, making it difficult to assess the information and impossible to retrieve it at a later date to support legal proceedings (Huitfeldt, E). In this case, the intelligence product itself was useful, but it was filed away in somebody’s email account never to surface again. This example is consistent with findings of a study by the Rand Corporation that suggested intelligence products lose the majority of their value within 48 hours of being produced (Davis, P). In these times, there are so many security threats that no country is capable of dealing with them all on their own. The key to prevailing in the face of these threats is working together in intelligence sharing and analyses, and the key to this is having the right information in the right place at the right time (Pope, M).
Traditionally, organizations across agencies and across different governments have tried to share information and collaborate using their own technology solutions. These range from email to sophisticated portals and just because solutions exist and are in use, does not mean that they are either effective or efficient.
4. Benefits and Impacts
Improved maritime security is the primary benefit that is derived from this initiative. The reason that nations have decided to participate in this initiative is because they realize that the security of their own coast and the safety of their own citizens very much depends upon security in the maritime regions. Information is now exchanged on specific maritime security threats and challenges. An important part of this exchange process is the intelligence agencies’ greater knowledge of the broader context in which their coast guard counterparts are operating. In some instances intelligence agencies have been able to advise coast guards of potential maritime security threats before these have even materialized. An example is the recent sharing by one allied intelligence agency of intelligence on a regional group that highlighted a potential to target a specific country’s interests in the area of illegal exploitation of national resources. This information helped the coast guard of that country to monitor the activities of the group and eventually take preventive action to stop a specific related security incident. In the long term it is hoped that the sharing of information and intelligence will influence the changing of state behavior so that activities threatening maritime security will be reduced. An example of this has already occurred in the Malacca Straits where information sharing between Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the UK has led to a reduction in piracy and sea robbery through coordinated sea and air patrols and improved information exchange.
The significantly enhanced exchange of information and intelligence between coast guards and intelligence officials has resulted in several impacts and benefits in both the short term and the long term. These improvements are in the following areas: improved maritime security, enhanced response capabilities to maritime security events, and the more efficient allocation of resources to deal with maritime security issues.
4.1 Improved Maritime Security
The primary goal of maritime security is to discourage and prevent threats at sea and in the maritime environment, protecting against the effects of incursion through attacks on infrastructure and resources. In security terms, the threat is the potential for an actor to exploit a vulnerability, i.e. a gap or weakness in security allowing them to damage or interfere with something of value. The paper has already identified the gaps in information and intelligence sharing in the maritime realm and discussed the value of resources. By the very definition, when something has value, it becomes a potential target for criminals or terrorists who will try to exploit weaknesses in security to gain access to it. They will research and scope the target, looking for a gap in security which will maximize their chances of success and minimize their chances of being caught. The more advanced the threat, the more likely it is to succeed in an attack. The intelligence-led approach facilitates a move from simple threat awareness to a detailed understanding of threats to the maritime environment and the specific vulnerabilities they intend to exploit. This understanding is the basis for risk assessment and risk management, seeking to identify and reduce vulnerabilities, thus preventing threats from materializing. When vulnerabilities can be identified, and a level of threat understood, it is also possible to implement a proportional and cost-effective security measure to counter it. Failure to safeguard against threat activity can lead to the onset of a crisis, whether the cause is a sudden attack or a natural disaster rendering damage to infrastructure and resources. Finally, it is the prevention of crisis and protection against threats and hazards that contribute to stability and the safety of the general public. All of these concepts are interlinked and are, in essence, stages of the security process. The commonly used example is a three-legged stool where if any of the legs are broken, the stool will collapse. Failure in security is not always immediately obvious, but often it is the absence of an event or the minor size of an event that is evidence of success. Conversely, failure may result in significant consequences. A recent and clear example is the damage caused to the Gulf of Mexico by the BP oil spill. An intelligence-led approach with collaboration between US agencies could have identified that the existing level of regulation and the preparedness of companies operating in the gulf was insufficient to the potential threats from the oil industry. Requirements should have been set for the prevention and mitigation of various incidents that could damage the environment. This, in turn, would have led to inspections and enforcement to ensure that the companies were operating safe practices. The identification of the spill as a threat or hazard to the gulf would have allowed BP and other companies to have a preparedness plan, and it would be that plan which is critical in the ability to respond and recover from those incidents.
4.2 Enhanced Response Capabilities
The improved fusion of intelligence, combined with joint training and operations, will greatly enhance the capabilities of all agencies in responding to any given situation. The training and intelligence exchange programme will provide fruitful, with intelligence agency staff training coast guard personnel on how to identify intelligence of interest and how to effectively communicate this information for action. This will also be beneficial for coast guards who are not in a position to dedicate staff to intelligence functions. In this instance, the coast guard could employ a liaison officer whose sole role is to interact with the intelligence community. This training and the understanding of intelligence systems will also enable coast guards to exploit intelligence products that are hosted on restricted intelligence networks. This will result in more intelligence-led operations in the maritime environment. Intel ops are a proven method of interdicting illegal activity and the knowledge and training gleaned from intelligence agencies will enable coast guards to conduct more effective intelligence-led operations. The joint training and exercises will enable all agencies to bring together a collective capability to respond to any situation. This may involve a mix of military, law enforcement, and civil resources to mitigate the situation. Currently, agencies may have individual niche capabilities but the full spectrum of resources is not always available. An example would be the prevention of a high-level drug smuggling operation which may involve surveillance and eventual interdiction of a vessel at sea. The intelligence agencies may have knowledge of the suspects and the vessel in question but are unlikely to have the requisite law enforcement and/or military assets to task the coast guard to take action. By pooling resources and assets, all agencies will benefit in being able to call upon the best mix of resources to deal with the situation. An important aspect of pooling resources will be in the establishment of designated intelligence support. This will involve intelligence agencies providing coast guards with real-time intelligence and analysis support to operations that are unfolding at sea. Currently, this is ad hoc at best and often coast guards are required to rely solely on their own organic assets. This can be a force multiplier for coast guards and enable them to achieve far better results than operating independently. However, perhaps the greatest potential in enhancing response capabilities lies in the development of anticipatory intelligence and operations. With a greater understanding of the issues at stake and the use of collective intelligence, coast guards and intelligence agencies will be able to take pre-emptive action to negate situations before they become a serious threat to security. This may involve the disruption of logistics and resupply for criminal or terrorist organizations or the prevention of a specific illegal act. At this point in time, it is difficult to measure the success of such operations but with a firm belief in the potential results, this area is likely to grow in the future.
4.3 Efficient Resource Allocation
Now that we have documented the various information sharing methods that will be utilized, the next step is to consider the likely implications of using these methods to share intelligence in the maritime domain. The first thing to analyze are the uses that the coastguard agencies have for the intelligence products; this ranges from the prediction of incoming intelligence to the forecast of shipping that will be in a specific country’s area of interest. This in itself is an indirect method of threat prediction; if agencies can predict where potential threats are likely to occur, they can seek intelligence on these specific areas. By doing this, they can avoid information overload as they will only seek intelligence on areas where there is a perceived threat. This more streamlined approach to intelligence seeking also applies to the navies of these coastguard agencies. With better quality and more tactically useful intelligence, surface and subsurface naval units will have a clearer picture of the areas in which they will be operating. An increased knowledge of the surface picture will result in better anti-drug and immigration operations, for example, where units will be able to pinpoint and intercept smuggling vessels. In terms of the allocation of air assets, again better intelligence will result in a clearer picture of where these assets are needed to conduct surveillance or search and rescue operations.
The next aspect of intelligence resource allocation is the coordination with other agencies, whether they are from the same or different countries. It is often the case that coastguard and naval units are sent to provide intelligence or surveillance support to other agencies, but are unsure of exactly what is required of them. This unclear tasking usually results in an inefficient use of allocated assets. A clearer picture of what is required can be gained through the use of intelligence liaison officers. These are officers who are trained in intelligence and can therefore more effectively communicate with the intelligence agencies to determine what information is required and in what format. These officers will also have a greater understanding of the intelligence process algorithm and as such will be able to provide clear and concise guidance to the units that they are supporting.