What kind of evidence would count for us to claim that (some) animals are minded? Discuss making reference to Dennett (1995) and Jamieson (1998). TOPIC: Animal ethics
The question of whether animals are minded has been a controversial topic in philosophy, psychology, and biology. There is still no clear agreement on what constitutes evidence for animal minds, but there are a few approaches that have been proposed.

One approach is to look at the behavior of animals and see if it suggests that they have mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. This is known as the behaviorist approach, which holds that only observable behavior is relevant for determining whether animals have minds.

However, this approach has been criticized by philosophers such as Daniel Dennett (1995), who argue that behavior alone cannot provide sufficient evidence for animal minds. Dennett claims that behavior can be interpreted in different ways, and that we need to consider the functional role that mental states play in explaining behavior. For example, if an animal appears to be searching for food, we need to ask whether it is doing so because it has a belief that food is present in a certain location and a desire to obtain it.

Another approach is to look at the neurobiology of animals and see if it suggests that they have mental states. This is known as the cognitive approach, which holds that mental states are represented in the brain and can be studied using neuroscience techniques.

However, this approach has also been criticized by philosophers such as Sue Jamieson (1998), who argue that neurobiology alone cannot provide sufficient evidence for animal minds. Jamieson claims that neuroscience can only tell us about the physical mechanisms underlying behavior, but it cannot tell us about the subjective experience of animals. For example, neuroscience can tell us which brain regions are activated when an animal is in pain, but it cannot tell us what it feels like for the animal to experience pain.

Therefore, a more comprehensive approach to providing evidence for animal minds would involve considering both behavior and neurobiology, as well as other factors such as evolutionary history and ecological context. We need to look at how animals behave in different situations and how their behavior is influenced by their internal states, such as hunger, fear, and pleasure. We also need to consider the similarities and differences between animal minds and human minds, and how they have evolved over time.

In summary, there is no simple answer to the question of what kind of evidence would count for us to claim that animals are minded. It requires a nuanced and interdisciplinary approach that takes into account multiple lines of evidence and different perspectives, as well as an awareness of the ethical implications of our conclusions for animal welfare and conservation.